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Cisco 400-007 Practice Test 35

Question 340

A network design team is assessing this customer situation: A campus backbone advertises thousands of component routes and faces scalability limits. The customer requires clear acceptance tests before a new contract is signed. Which failure is the most direct risk of taking the tempting design shortcut?

  1. Compliance and latency failures emerge as the business footprint grows
  2. Frequent access events can trigger unnecessary network-wide SPF recalculations
  3. A single control-plane fault can suppress route visibility across unrelated regions
  4. Packets can follow an apparently valid summary into a failed network segment

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: D

A.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Define regional route, policy and service boundaries from business geography and data constraints. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Packets can follow an apparently valid summary into a failed network segment. The distinction follows from: Aggregation reduces control-plane scale but indiscriminate masking can hide the only valid failure path.

B.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Packets can follow an apparently valid summary into a failed network segment. The distinction follows from: Aggregation reduces control-plane scale but indiscriminate masking can hide the only valid failure path.

C.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Build redundant route-reflector clusters with policy-consistent hierarchy and independent failure domains. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Packets can follow an apparently valid summary into a failed network segment. The distinction follows from: Aggregation reduces control-plane scale but indiscriminate masking can hide the only valid failure path.

D.

Packets can follow an apparently valid summary into a failed network segment. That is the risk in the reported situation—A campus backbone advertises thousands of component routes and faces scalability limits. The corrective action is: Summarize at stable boundaries while retaining explicitly required more-specific exceptions. Technical basis: Aggregation reduces control-plane scale but indiscriminate masking can hide the only valid failure path.

Question 341

In a separate customer architecture review, this issue arises: A carrier must aggregate customer branches yet keep one active disaster-recovery site reachable via a specific path. The proposed design must be reversible within the agreed maintenance window. Which technical rationale best explains the proposed design choice under these constraints?

  1. Aggregation reduces control-plane scale but indiscriminate masking can hide the only valid failure path
  2. Reachability should reflect differentiated business constraints, not a single cheapest route for all traffic
  3. Modularity limits correlated operational impact without eliminating necessary inter-module connectivity
  4. IS-IS hierarchy can keep detailed local topology from burdening the backbone while preserving needed reachability

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: A

A.

Aggregation reduces control-plane scale but indiscriminate masking can hide the only valid failure path. This explains the action: Summarize at stable boundaries while retaining explicitly required more-specific exceptions. For the described facts—A carrier must aggregate customer branches yet keep one active disaster-recovery site reachable via a specific path—test the outcome through: A simulated component failure uses the required exception route and prevents forwarding into a summary black hole.

B.

The alternative principle is: Reachability should reflect differentiated business constraints, not a single cheapest route for all traffic. It instead explains this action: Translate data classification and service ownership into explicit path and segmentation policy. For the present requirement, the controlling mechanism is: Aggregation reduces control-plane scale but indiscriminate masking can hide the only valid failure path.

C.

The alternative principle is: Modularity limits correlated operational impact without eliminating necessary inter-module connectivity. It instead explains this action: Partition modules by failure, ownership and change cadence with carefully designed routed boundaries. For the present requirement, the controlling mechanism is: Aggregation reduces control-plane scale but indiscriminate masking can hide the only valid failure path. The scenario is: A carrier must aggregate customer branches yet keep one active disaster-recovery site reachable via a specific path.

D.

The alternative principle is: IS-IS hierarchy can keep detailed local topology from burdening the backbone while preserving needed reachability. It instead explains this action: Use L1/L2 boundaries and leak only policy-approved interlevel routes. For the present requirement, the controlling mechanism is: Aggregation reduces control-plane scale but indiscriminate masking can hide the only valid failure path.

Question 342

In a separate customer architecture review, this issue arises: A carrier must aggregate customer branches yet keep one active disaster-recovery site reachable via a specific path. The proposed design must be reversible within the agreed maintenance window. Which acceptance result would most convincingly demonstrate that the design addresses the critical requirement?

  1. Tests demonstrate classified flows remain on permitted paths through normal and degraded states
  2. A simulated component failure uses the required exception route and prevents forwarding into a summary black hole
  3. A staged module maintenance test leaves unrelated applications within stated SLOs
  4. Route tests show each classified prefix chooses the intended next hop before and after peer failure

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: B

A.

The offered observation would test: Translate data classification and service ownership into explicit path and segmentation policy. It would not establish that the stated requirement has been met. The direct evidence needed here is: A simulated component failure uses the required exception route and prevents forwarding into a summary black hole.

B.

Direct verification: A simulated component failure uses the required exception route and prevents forwarding into a summary black hole. This is the relevant evidence for the action: Summarize at stable boundaries while retaining explicitly required more-specific exceptions. The reason is: Aggregation reduces control-plane scale but indiscriminate masking can hide the only valid failure path. The scenario is: A carrier must aggregate customer branches yet keep one active disaster-recovery site reachable via a specific path.

C.

The offered observation would test: Partition modules by failure, ownership and change cadence with carefully designed routed boundaries. It would not establish that the stated requirement has been met. The direct evidence needed here is: A simulated component failure uses the required exception route and prevents forwarding into a summary black hole.

D.

The offered observation would test: Implement documented local preference and community policy at controlled BGP boundaries. It would not establish that the stated requirement has been met. The direct evidence needed here is: A simulated component failure uses the required exception route and prevents forwarding into a summary black hole. The scenario is: A carrier must aggregate customer branches yet keep one active disaster-recovery site reachable via a specific path.

Question 343

In a separate customer architecture review, this issue arises: A carrier must aggregate customer branches yet keep one active disaster-recovery site reachable via a specific path. The proposed design must be reversible within the agreed maintenance window. Which failure is the most direct risk of taking the tempting design shortcut?

  1. Control-plane churn and database scale can degrade backbone convergence
  2. One routine maintenance error can affect every campus building and critical service
  3. Packets can follow an apparently valid summary into a failed network segment
  4. Sensitive traffic can violate contractual or regulatory boundaries during recovery

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: C

A.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Use L1/L2 boundaries and leak only policy-approved interlevel routes. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Packets can follow an apparently valid summary into a failed network segment. The distinction follows from: Aggregation reduces control-plane scale but indiscriminate masking can hide the only valid failure path.

B.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Partition modules by failure, ownership and change cadence with carefully designed routed boundaries. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Packets can follow an apparently valid summary into a failed network segment. The distinction follows from: Aggregation reduces control-plane scale but indiscriminate masking can hide the only valid failure path.

C.

Packets can follow an apparently valid summary into a failed network segment. That is the risk in the reported situation—A carrier must aggregate customer branches yet keep one active disaster-recovery site reachable via a specific path. The corrective action is: Summarize at stable boundaries while retaining explicitly required more-specific exceptions. Technical basis: Aggregation reduces control-plane scale but indiscriminate masking can hide the only valid failure path.

D.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Translate data classification and service ownership into explicit path and segmentation policy. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Packets can follow an apparently valid summary into a failed network segment. The distinction follows from: Aggregation reduces control-plane scale but indiscriminate masking can hide the only valid failure path.

Question 344

In a separate customer architecture review, this issue arises: A carrier must aggregate customer branches yet keep one active disaster-recovery site reachable via a specific path. The proposed design must be reversible within the agreed maintenance window. Which prerequisite should the architect confirm before choosing and defending this design?

  1. Collect data classification, alternate path guarantees and failure-state policy exceptions
  2. Assess L1/L2 connectivity, leaking policy, default routing behavior and dual-stack support
  3. Evaluate BGP path selection, cluster identifiers, route-policy parity and reflector CPU limits
  4. Map site ownership, aggregate reachability, return paths and route-withdrawal behavior

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: D

A.

The offered preparation belongs with the alternative action: Translate data classification and service ownership into explicit path and segmentation policy. Here the necessary starting condition is: Map site ownership, aggregate reachability, return paths and route-withdrawal behavior. It supports: Summarize at stable boundaries while retaining explicitly required more-specific exceptions.

B.

The offered preparation belongs with the alternative action: Use L1/L2 boundaries and leak only policy-approved interlevel routes. Here the necessary starting condition is: Map site ownership, aggregate reachability, return paths and route-withdrawal behavior. It supports: Summarize at stable boundaries while retaining explicitly required more-specific exceptions.

C.

The offered preparation belongs with the alternative action: Build redundant route-reflector clusters with policy-consistent hierarchy and independent failure domains. Here the necessary starting condition is: Map site ownership, aggregate reachability, return paths and route-withdrawal behavior. It supports: Summarize at stable boundaries while retaining explicitly required more-specific exceptions.

D.

The necessary starting condition is: Map site ownership, aggregate reachability, return paths and route-withdrawal behavior. This enables the action: Summarize at stable boundaries while retaining explicitly required more-specific exceptions. Validate the result with: A simulated component failure uses the required exception route and prevents forwarding into a summary black hole.

Question 345

A network design team is assessing this customer situation: A sprawling campus area generates disruptive LSAs whenever an access ring flaps. One site experiences high evening utilization, so average daytime counters may mislead. Which high-level network design choice most directly meets the stated technical and operational requirement?

  1. Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability
  2. Implement documented local preference and community policy at controlled BGP boundaries
  3. Partition modules by failure, ownership and change cadence with carefully designed routed boundaries
  4. Place inference and synchronization paths according to latency, bandwidth, privacy and model update patterns

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: A

A.

Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability. The relevant technical reason is: OSPF flooding domains and summary design affect CPU load, SPF frequency and fault propagation. Confirm through: A branch link-flap test limits LSA churn to its intended domain while regional routes remain valid.

B.

BGP selects paths by policy attributes; physical bandwidth alone cannot express compliant reachability intent. That supports the alternative intervention: Implement documented local preference and community policy at controlled BGP boundaries. The present situation—A sprawling campus area generates disruptive LSAs whenever an access ring flaps—instead calls for: Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability. Technical basis: OSPF flooding domains and summary design affect CPU load, SPF frequency and fault propagation.

C.

The alternative addresses: Partition modules by failure, ownership and change cadence with carefully designed routed boundaries. Its principle is: Modularity limits correlated operational impact without eliminating necessary inter-module connectivity. In this case the needed action is: Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability. Confirm by: A branch link-flap test limits LSA churn to its intended domain while regional routes remain valid.

D.

The alternative addresses a different technical concern: Inference access, training refresh and data transfer create different east-west and WAN demands. The governing mechanism here is: OSPF flooding domains and summary design affect CPU load, SPF frequency and fault propagation. Accordingly, use: Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability.

Question 346

A network design team is assessing this customer situation: A sprawling campus area generates disruptive LSAs whenever an access ring flaps. One site experiences high evening utilization, so average daytime counters may mislead. Which acceptance result would most convincingly demonstrate that the design addresses the critical requirement?

  1. A lab-induced access loop is contained to its edge segment while routed services remain reachable
  2. A branch link-flap test limits LSA churn to its intended domain while regional routes remain valid
  3. Route tests show each classified prefix chooses the intended next hop before and after peer failure
  4. A staged module maintenance test leaves unrelated applications within stated SLOs

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: B

A.

The offered observation would test: Limit access-layer L2 domains and use routed distribution boundaries with edge-loop safeguards. It would not establish that the stated requirement has been met. The direct evidence needed here is: A branch link-flap test limits LSA churn to its intended domain while regional routes remain valid.

B.

Direct verification: A branch link-flap test limits LSA churn to its intended domain while regional routes remain valid. This is the relevant evidence for the action: Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability. The reason is: OSPF flooding domains and summary design affect CPU load, SPF frequency and fault propagation.

C.

The offered observation would test: Implement documented local preference and community policy at controlled BGP boundaries. It would not establish that the stated requirement has been met. The direct evidence needed here is: A branch link-flap test limits LSA churn to its intended domain while regional routes remain valid.

D.

The offered observation would test: Partition modules by failure, ownership and change cadence with carefully designed routed boundaries. It would not establish that the stated requirement has been met. The direct evidence needed here is: A branch link-flap test limits LSA churn to its intended domain while regional routes remain valid.

Question 347

A network design team is assessing this customer situation: A sprawling campus area generates disruptive LSAs whenever an access ring flaps. One site experiences high evening utilization, so average daytime counters may mislead. Which failure is the most direct risk of taking the tempting design shortcut?

  1. Routing feedback can create loops, unstable preference or unexpected reachability
  2. Packets can follow an apparently valid summary into a failed network segment
  3. Frequent access events can trigger unnecessary network-wide SPF recalculations
  4. A model false positive can propagate a widespread outage or violate an SLA

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: C

A.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Bound redistribution to explicit prefixes and tags, preventing reintroduction of learned routes. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Frequent access events can trigger unnecessary network-wide SPF recalculations. The distinction follows from: OSPF flooding domains and summary design affect CPU load, SPF frequency and fault propagation.

B.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Summarize at stable boundaries while retaining explicitly required more-specific exceptions. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Frequent access events can trigger unnecessary network-wide SPF recalculations. The distinction follows from: OSPF flooding domains and summary design affect CPU load, SPF frequency and fault propagation.

C.

Frequent access events can trigger unnecessary network-wide SPF recalculations. That is the risk in the reported situation—A sprawling campus area generates disruptive LSAs whenever an access ring flaps. The corrective action is: Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability. Technical basis: OSPF flooding domains and summary design affect CPU load, SPF frequency and fault propagation.

D.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Use AI recommendations as evidence with simulation and gated human-controlled network changes. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Frequent access events can trigger unnecessary network-wide SPF recalculations. The distinction follows from: OSPF flooding domains and summary design affect CPU load, SPF frequency and fault propagation.

Question 348

A network design team is assessing this customer situation: A sprawling campus area generates disruptive LSAs whenever an access ring flaps. One site experiences high evening utilization, so average daytime counters may mislead. Which prerequisite should the architect confirm before choosing and defending this design?

  1. Measure token and payload patterns, model placement, accelerator interconnect and policy
  2. Assess L1/L2 connectivity, leaking policy, default routing behavior and dual-stack support
  3. Evaluate BGP path selection, cluster identifiers, route-policy parity and reflector CPU limits
  4. Inventory LSA count, ABR redundancy, summarization assumptions and failure-path needs

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: D

A.

The offered preparation belongs with the alternative action: Place inference and synchronization paths according to latency, bandwidth, privacy and model update patterns. Here the necessary starting condition is: Inventory LSA count, ABR redundancy, summarization assumptions and failure-path needs. It supports: Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability.

B.

The offered preparation belongs with the alternative action: Use L1/L2 boundaries and leak only policy-approved interlevel routes. Here the necessary starting condition is: Inventory LSA count, ABR redundancy, summarization assumptions and failure-path needs. It supports: Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability.

C.

The offered preparation belongs with the alternative action: Build redundant route-reflector clusters with policy-consistent hierarchy and independent failure domains. Here the necessary starting condition is: Inventory LSA count, ABR redundancy, summarization assumptions and failure-path needs. It supports: Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability.

D.

The necessary starting condition is: Inventory LSA count, ABR redundancy, summarization assumptions and failure-path needs. This enables the action: Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability. Validate the result with: A branch link-flap test limits LSA churn to its intended domain while regional routes remain valid.

Question 349

In a separate customer architecture review, this issue arises: A national retail backbone extends one OSPF area through every small remote branch. Audit evidence must be retained separately from the devices under change. Which high-level network design choice most directly meets the stated technical and operational requirement?

  1. Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability
  2. Bound redistribution to explicit prefixes and tags, preventing reintroduction of learned routes
  3. Partition modules by failure, ownership and change cadence with carefully designed routed boundaries
  4. Place inference and synchronization paths according to latency, bandwidth, privacy and model update patterns

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: A

A.

OSPF flooding domains and summary design affect CPU load, SPF frequency and fault propagation. First establish the prerequisite: Inventory LSA count, ABR redundancy, summarization assumptions and failure-path needs. The proposed response is: Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability. Validation: A branch link-flap test limits LSA churn to its intended domain while regional routes remain valid.

B.

The alternative addresses: Bound redistribution to explicit prefixes and tags, preventing reintroduction of learned routes. Its principle is: Route tags and constrained policy prevent loops when the same prefix traverses multiple protocol domains. In this case the needed action is: Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability. Confirm by: A branch link-flap test limits LSA churn to its intended domain while regional routes remain valid.

C.

The alternative addresses a different technical concern: Modularity limits correlated operational impact without eliminating necessary inter-module connectivity. The governing mechanism here is: OSPF flooding domains and summary design affect CPU load, SPF frequency and fault propagation. Accordingly, use: Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability.

D.

Inference access, training refresh and data transfer create different east-west and WAN demands. That supports the alternative intervention: Place inference and synchronization paths according to latency, bandwidth, privacy and model update patterns. The present situation—A national retail backbone extends one OSPF area through every small remote branch—instead calls for: Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability. Technical basis: OSPF flooding domains and summary design affect CPU load, SPF frequency and fault propagation.

Question 350

In a separate customer architecture review, this issue arises: A national retail backbone extends one OSPF area through every small remote branch. Audit evidence must be retained separately from the devices under change. Which technical rationale best explains the proposed design choice under these constraints?

  1. Modularity limits correlated operational impact without eliminating necessary inter-module connectivity
  2. OSPF flooding domains and summary design affect CPU load, SPF frequency and fault propagation
  3. Smaller broadcast domains and loop controls constrain accidental Layer 2 topology changes
  4. Aggregation reduces control-plane scale but indiscriminate masking can hide the only valid failure path

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: B

A.

The alternative principle is: Modularity limits correlated operational impact without eliminating necessary inter-module connectivity. It instead explains this action: Partition modules by failure, ownership and change cadence with carefully designed routed boundaries. For the present requirement, the controlling mechanism is: OSPF flooding domains and summary design affect CPU load, SPF frequency and fault propagation.

B.

OSPF flooding domains and summary design affect CPU load, SPF frequency and fault propagation. This explains the action: Create area boundaries and resilient ABRs that localize topology changes without isolating reachability. For the described facts—A national retail backbone extends one OSPF area through every small remote branch—test the outcome through: A branch link-flap test limits LSA churn to its intended domain while regional routes remain valid.

C.

The alternative principle is: Smaller broadcast domains and loop controls constrain accidental Layer 2 topology changes. It instead explains this action: Limit access-layer L2 domains and use routed distribution boundaries with edge-loop safeguards. For the present requirement, the controlling mechanism is: OSPF flooding domains and summary design affect CPU load, SPF frequency and fault propagation.

D.

The alternative principle is: Aggregation reduces control-plane scale but indiscriminate masking can hide the only valid failure path. It instead explains this action: Summarize at stable boundaries while retaining explicitly required more-specific exceptions. For the present requirement, the controlling mechanism is: OSPF flooding domains and summary design affect CPU load, SPF frequency and fault propagation.

Cisco Certified Design Expert (400-007) Practice Tests