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EXAM: Microsoft Security, Compliance, and Identity Fundamentals
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Microsoft SC-900 Practice Test 25

Question 240

For this case—A background service and a human operator appear under the same sign-in identity, preventing investigators from isolating who performed a privileged task.—which implementation and acceptance check are correctly paired?

  1. Action: Choose cloud-only authentication or a supported hybrid password hash, pass-through or federation approach based on business and dependency constraints. Validation: Perform documented test sign-ins during a controlled laboratory loss of on-prem connectivity and record expected sign-in differences for the chosen model.
  2. Action: Use Microsoft Entra entitlement management access packages to define approved bundles of applications, groups or sites with requester and expiration policies. Validation: Have a synthetic contractor request a test package, approve it, inspect granted group access and confirm expiration removes access according to policy.
  3. Action: Use Microsoft Entra ID as the tenant's cloud directory for registered users, groups, applications and sign-in policy without assuming it is a physical domain controller. Validation: List synthetic tenant users, registered applications and sign-in events, then verify a separate legacy AD DS Group Policy test remains outside Entra-only functions.
  4. Action: Classify identities by the actor performing work and apply supported human, service or agent access controls instead of assuming all principals are employee user accounts. Validation: Examine a sample employee sign-in, workload service principal access and registered agent identity, verifying each uses the intended tenant permissions.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The situation is that a background service and a human operator appear under the same sign-in identity, preventing investigators from isolating who performed a privileged task. Classify identities by the actor performing work and apply supported human, service or agent access controls instead of assuming all principals are employee user accounts. Validation: Examine a sample employee sign-in, workload service principal access and registered agent identity, verifying each uses the intended tenant permissions. The action and test belong together because an automated service principal or agent identity has a different accountability and token lifecycle from an interactive workforce member or external guest.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That action-and-evidence pair concerns “distinguish cloud-only and hybrid identity sign-in choices”, not this decision. The appropriate action is to classify identities by the actor performing work and apply supported human, service or agent access controls instead of assuming all principals are employee user accounts. To confirm, examine a sample employee sign-in, workload service principal access and registered agent identity, verifying each uses the intended tenant permissions.

B:

The proposed pair focuses on “provision time-bound entitlement management access packages” instead. The appropriate action is to classify identities by the actor performing work and apply supported human, service or agent access controls instead of assuming all principals are employee user accounts. To confirm, examine a sample employee sign-in, workload service principal access and registered agent identity, verifying each uses the intended tenant permissions.

C:

“identify a Microsoft entra tenant as cloud identity directory” evaluates a different intervention. The appropriate action is to classify identities by the actor performing work and apply supported human, service or agent access controls instead of assuming all principals are employee user accounts. To confirm, examine a sample employee sign-in, workload service principal access and registered agent identity, verifying each uses the intended tenant permissions.

Question 241

A financial institution seeks stronger sign-in for administrators after attackers repeatedly capture passwords and text-message one-time codes. Which implementation or design choice most directly mitigates the stated issue?

  1. Use supported passkeys or FIDO2 security keys for users needing phishing-resistant passwordless sign-in instead of relying only on reusable knowledge secrets.
  2. Issue a time-limited Temporary Access Pass through authorized policy for a supported user recovery or initial passwordless registration workflow.
  3. Configure Microsoft Entra self-service password reset with supported authentication methods and registration requirements appropriate to user risk.
  4. Deploy supported Windows Hello for Business or platform passkeys where suitable and keep resource authorization decisions separate from the authentication method.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Use supported passkeys or FIDO2 security keys for users needing phishing-resistant passwordless sign-in instead of relying only on reusable knowledge secrets. FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure. To verify, sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“use temporary access pass for supported onboarding and recovery” is related to another task, not the failure shown here. FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

C:

This alternative focuses on “enable self-service password reset with adequate identity verification” instead of the required outcome. FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

D:

That choice concerns “use passwordless sign-in without assuming authorization grants”, not the immediate requirement. FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

Question 242

A financial institution seeks stronger sign-in for administrators after attackers repeatedly capture passwords and text-message one-time codes. Which technical explanation most directly supports the right approach?

  1. Authentication methods availability is governed by tenant policy and user targeting, not merely by a user installing an authenticator app.
  2. FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.
  3. Passwordless sign-in changes how the user proves identity but does not confer additional access rights or eliminate policy evaluation for resources.
  4. Banned-password screening addresses weak and predictable strings at creation or change time, complementing MFA rather than replacing it.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure. This supports the decision to use supported passkeys or FIDO2 security keys for users needing phishing-resistant passwordless sign-in instead of relying only on reusable knowledge secrets.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The principle behind “set authentication method policies for approved factors” is not the one being tested. Here, FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

C:

“use passwordless sign-in without assuming authorization grants” explains a different mechanism. Here, FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

D:

That statement concerns “apply Microsoft entra password protection and banned-password rules” rather than the cause in this case. Here, FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

Question 243

For this situation—A financial institution seeks stronger sign-in for administrators after attackers repeatedly capture passwords and text-message one-time codes.—which check provides the strongest verification?

  1. Attempt to set a known weak test password or an organization-themed variation and verify the policy rejects it during the supported change path.
  2. Issue a test pass with configured expiry, register a permitted strong method, and verify reuse and expiration follow the chosen configuration.
  3. Sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.
  4. Trigger a controlled sign-in, check the matching number on the authentic request, and verify an unsolicited prompt is explicitly rejected.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response. It is the relevant test because FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“apply Microsoft entra password protection and banned-password rules” would verify a different part of the system. To check this result, sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.

B:

That test concerns “use temporary access pass for supported onboarding and recovery”, not the requested outcome. To check this result, sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.

D:

This evidence addresses “use Microsoft authenticator notifications with secure number matching” instead of confirming the repair. To check this result, sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.

Question 244

A financial institution seeks stronger sign-in for administrators after attackers repeatedly capture passwords and text-message one-time codes. If the team does the following—"Require users to type their password and one-time code into any webpage bearing the company logo without checking the actual login origin."—what could go wrong?

  1. Password spraying can succeed against common predictable choices despite user awareness campaigns and regular forced changes.
  2. Compromise of one knowledge-based credential source may satisfy both prompts and leave the account exposed despite a claim of MFA.
  3. An attacker may seize user accounts by abusing weak password recovery, even though ordinary interactive sign-in requires MFA.
  4. An attacker may steal and immediately replay credentials collected by a realistic phishing proxy despite the presence of ordinary one-time codes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

An attacker may steal and immediately replay credentials collected by a realistic phishing proxy despite the presence of ordinary one-time codes. The shortcut is unsafe because FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That consequence concerns “Password spraying can succeed against common predictable choices despite user awareness campaigns and regular forced changes”, which is a different failure. Here, an attacker may steal and immediately replay credentials collected by a realistic phishing proxy despite the presence of ordinary one-time codes.

B:

“Compromise of one knowledge-based credential source may satisfy both prompts and leave the account exposed despite…” does not describe the result of this shortcut. Here, an attacker may steal and immediately replay credentials collected by a realistic phishing proxy despite the presence of ordinary one-time codes.

C:

The alternative risk relates to “An attacker may seize user accounts by abusing weak password recovery, even though ordinary interactive sign-in…”, not the stated mistake. Here, an attacker may steal and immediately replay credentials collected by a realistic phishing proxy despite the presence of ordinary one-time codes.

Question 245

A financial institution seeks stronger sign-in for administrators after attackers repeatedly capture passwords and text-message one-time codes. Which action and validation evidence belong together?

  1. Action: Use supported passkeys or FIDO2 security keys for users needing phishing-resistant passwordless sign-in instead of relying only on reusable knowledge secrets. Validation: Sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.
  2. Action: Require two or more independent authentication factor categories, such as a password and registered device proof, for sensitive sign-ins. Validation: Test a protected account's sign-in and record that a separate possession or inherence factor is required in addition to its knowledge secret.
  3. Action: Enable supported Microsoft Authenticator push prompts with number matching and user context to make fraudulent approval attempts harder to accept. Validation: Trigger a controlled sign-in, check the matching number on the authentic request, and verify an unsolicited prompt is explicitly rejected.
  4. Action: Configure Microsoft Entra self-service password reset with supported authentication methods and registration requirements appropriate to user risk. Validation: Reset a sandbox user's password through its registered recovery factors and confirm an unregistered stranger cannot complete the same flow.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Use supported passkeys or FIDO2 security keys for users needing phishing-resistant passwordless sign-in instead of relying only on reusable knowledge secrets. Validation: Sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response. The action and test belong together because FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“explain multifactor authentication as independent factor categories” evaluates a different intervention. The appropriate action is to use supported passkeys or FIDO2 security keys for users needing phishing-resistant passwordless sign-in instead of relying only on reusable knowledge secrets. To confirm, sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.

C:

The linked action and check for “use Microsoft authenticator notifications with secure number matching” would not resolve this case. The appropriate action is to use supported passkeys or FIDO2 security keys for users needing phishing-resistant passwordless sign-in instead of relying only on reusable knowledge secrets. To confirm, sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.

D:

That action-and-evidence pair concerns “enable self-service password reset with adequate identity verification”, not this decision. The appropriate action is to use supported passkeys or FIDO2 security keys for users needing phishing-resistant passwordless sign-in instead of relying only on reusable knowledge secrets. To confirm, sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.

Question 246

An SC-900 learner considers: A remote executive signs in through a fake portal and security leaders consider using FIDO2 keys to prevent lookalike-origin credential collection. What is the most appropriate next decision?

  1. Require two or more independent authentication factor categories, such as a password and registered device proof, for sensitive sign-ins.
  2. Use supported passkeys or FIDO2 security keys for users needing phishing-resistant passwordless sign-in instead of relying only on reusable knowledge secrets.
  3. Attach a user-assigned managed identity to multiple supported Azure resources when a shared, separately managed identity lifecycle is required.
  4. Issue a time-limited Temporary Access Pass through authorized policy for a supported user recovery or initial passwordless registration workflow.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The situation is that a remote executive signs in through a fake portal and security leaders consider using FIDO2 keys to prevent lookalike-origin credential collection. Use supported passkeys or FIDO2 security keys for users needing phishing-resistant passwordless sign-in instead of relying only on reusable knowledge secrets. FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure. To verify, sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“explain multifactor authentication as independent factor categories” is related to another task, not the failure shown here. FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

C:

That choice concerns “reuse user-assigned managed identity deliberately”, not the immediate requirement. FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

D:

The proposed action addresses “use temporary access pass for supported onboarding and recovery” rather than the problem described. FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

Question 247

A remote executive signs in through a fake portal and security leaders consider using FIDO2 keys to prevent lookalike-origin credential collection. Why does the recommended approach address this particular concern?

  1. A Temporary Access Pass is a controlled bootstrap mechanism with limited lifetime and policy restrictions rather than a permanent alternative to MFA.
  2. Banned-password screening addresses weak and predictable strings at creation or change time, complementing MFA rather than replacing it.
  3. FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.
  4. Self-service password reset can lower helpdesk load but is safe only when requesters prove their identity with approved recovery methods.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The situation is that a remote executive signs in through a fake portal and security leaders consider using FIDO2 keys to prevent lookalike-origin credential collection. FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure. This supports the decision to use supported passkeys or FIDO2 security keys for users needing phishing-resistant passwordless sign-in instead of relying only on reusable knowledge secrets.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“use temporary access pass for supported onboarding and recovery” describes another technical distinction. Here, FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

B:

“apply Microsoft entra password protection and banned-password rules” explains a different mechanism. Here, FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

D:

The principle behind “enable self-service password reset with adequate identity verification” is not the one being tested. Here, FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

Question 248

A remote executive signs in through a fake portal and security leaders consider using FIDO2 keys to prevent lookalike-origin credential collection. Which evidence best validates the proposed outcome?

  1. Test a protected account's sign-in and record that a separate possession or inherence factor is required in addition to its knowledge secret.
  2. Check method-policy eligibility for two synthetic groups, register an approved factor and verify an excluded group cannot enroll a restricted method.
  3. Attempt to set a known weak test password or an organization-themed variation and verify the policy rejects it during the supported change path.
  4. Sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The situation is that a remote executive signs in through a fake portal and security leaders consider using FIDO2 keys to prevent lookalike-origin credential collection. Sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response. It is the relevant test because FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That test concerns “explain multifactor authentication as independent factor categories”, not the requested outcome. To check this result, sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.

B:

The proposed check is relevant to “set authentication method policies for approved factors”, but not sufficient here. To check this result, sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.

C:

This evidence addresses “apply Microsoft entra password protection and banned-password rules” instead of confirming the repair. To check this result, sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.

Question 249

Consider this situation: A remote executive signs in through a fake portal and security leaders consider using FIDO2 keys to prevent lookalike-origin credential collection. A team member suggests: "Require users to type their password and one-time code into any webpage bearing the company logo without checking the actual login origin." What is the main risk?

  1. An attacker may steal and immediately replay credentials collected by a realistic phishing proxy despite the presence of ordinary one-time codes.
  2. A victim may approve an attacker's sign-in through MFA fatigue if alerts lack context and training to deny unauthorized requests.
  3. A strongly authenticated employee could gain unintended resource permissions if the system wrongly conflates strong identity proof with authorization.
  4. Password spraying can succeed against common predictable choices despite user awareness campaigns and regular forced changes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The situation is that a remote executive signs in through a fake portal and security leaders consider using FIDO2 keys to prevent lookalike-origin credential collection. An attacker may steal and immediately replay credentials collected by a realistic phishing proxy despite the presence of ordinary one-time codes. The shortcut is unsafe because FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

Incorrect Answers

B:

The alternative risk relates to “A victim may approve an attacker's sign-in through MFA fatigue if alerts lack context and training…”, not the stated mistake. Here, an attacker may steal and immediately replay credentials collected by a realistic phishing proxy despite the presence of ordinary one-time codes.

C:

“A strongly authenticated employee could gain unintended resource permissions if the system wrongly conflates strong identity…” can arise elsewhere, but it is not the most direct risk here. Here, an attacker may steal and immediately replay credentials collected by a realistic phishing proxy despite the presence of ordinary one-time codes.

D:

The situation is that a remote executive signs in through a fake portal and security leaders consider using FIDO2 keys to prevent lookalike-origin credential collection. That consequence concerns “Password spraying can succeed against common predictable choices despite user awareness campaigns and regular forced changes”, which is a different failure. Here, an attacker may steal and immediately replay credentials collected by a realistic phishing proxy despite the presence of ordinary one-time codes.

Question 250

A security and compliance reviewer considers: A remote executive signs in through a fake portal and security leaders consider using FIDO2 keys to prevent lookalike-origin credential collection. Which response and evidence should be linked?

  1. Action: Configure the appropriate Entra authentication methods policy and registration campaign so users can enroll only supported factors allowed by organizational policy. Validation: Check method-policy eligibility for two synthetic groups, register an approved factor and verify an excluded group cannot enroll a restricted method.
  2. Action: Use supported passkeys or FIDO2 security keys for users needing phishing-resistant passwordless sign-in instead of relying only on reusable knowledge secrets. Validation: Sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.
  3. Action: Issue a time-limited Temporary Access Pass through authorized policy for a supported user recovery or initial passwordless registration workflow. Validation: Issue a test pass with configured expiry, register a permitted strong method, and verify reuse and expiration follow the chosen configuration.
  4. Action: Deploy supported Windows Hello for Business or platform passkeys where suitable and keep resource authorization decisions separate from the authentication method. Validation: Compare a test user's successful Hello sign-in with a denied attempt to administer a restricted directory role that the account was never assigned.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The situation is that a remote executive signs in through a fake portal and security leaders consider using FIDO2 keys to prevent lookalike-origin credential collection. Use supported passkeys or FIDO2 security keys for users needing phishing-resistant passwordless sign-in instead of relying only on reusable knowledge secrets. Validation: Sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response. The action and test belong together because FIDO2 public-key authentication binds cryptographic proof to the legitimate relying party origin, reducing phishing and password replay exposure.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“set authentication method policies for approved factors” evaluates a different intervention. The appropriate action is to use supported passkeys or FIDO2 security keys for users needing phishing-resistant passwordless sign-in instead of relying only on reusable knowledge secrets. To confirm, sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.

C:

That action-and-evidence pair concerns “use temporary access pass for supported onboarding and recovery”, not this decision. The appropriate action is to use supported passkeys or FIDO2 security keys for users needing phishing-resistant passwordless sign-in instead of relying only on reusable knowledge secrets. To confirm, sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.

D:

The proposed pair focuses on “use passwordless sign-in without assuming authorization grants” instead. The appropriate action is to use supported passkeys or FIDO2 security keys for users needing phishing-resistant passwordless sign-in instead of relying only on reusable knowledge secrets. To confirm, sign in a test account with a registered security key and verify an untrusted lookalike site cannot produce a valid origin-bound authentication response.

Microsoft Security, Compliance, and Identity Fundamentals (SC-900) Practice Tests