Microsoft SC-900 Dumps
Microsoft SC-900 Practice Test 21
Question 200
A business app works in its publisher tenant but the customer cannot locate the corresponding enterprise application permissions locally. Which action and validation evidence belong together?
Explanation
Correct Answer
The situation is that a business app works in its publisher tenant but the customer cannot locate the corresponding enterprise application permissions locally. Register an application in Entra and grant its service principal explicitly approved permissions with a supported certificate or federated credential when appropriate. Validation: Check application object and enterprise application representation in a sandbox tenant and verify a token has only approved resource permissions. The action and test belong together because an app registration describes application identity while a service principal represents its concrete presence and authorization in a tenant.
Incorrect Answers
That action-and-evidence pair concerns “separate Microsoft entra directory roles from Azure resource RBAC”, not this decision. The appropriate action is to register an application in Entra and grant its service principal explicitly approved permissions with a supported certificate or federated credential when appropriate. To confirm, check application object and enterprise application representation in a sandbox tenant and verify a token has only approved resource permissions.
The proposed pair focuses on “prefer workload identity federation over stored CI secrets” instead. The appropriate action is to register an application in Entra and grant its service principal explicitly approved permissions with a supported certificate or federated credential when appropriate. To confirm, check application object and enterprise application representation in a sandbox tenant and verify a token has only approved resource permissions.
“synchronize hybrid identities with explicit scope and health checks” evaluates a different intervention. The appropriate action is to register an application in Entra and grant its service principal explicitly approved permissions with a supported certificate or federated credential when appropriate. To confirm, check application object and enterprise application representation in a sandbox tenant and verify a token has only approved resource permissions.
Question 201
For this cloud security and identity case, A GitHub Actions workflow needs to deploy an Azure test resource without keeping an Azure client secret in repository settings. What is the most appropriate next decision?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Use Entra workload identity federation to validate trusted external OIDC assertions from a supported build service before issuing an app access token. Federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI. To verify, run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token.
Incorrect Answers
“separate member and guest identities in collaboration” is related to another task, not the failure shown here. Federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
This alternative focuses on “use system-assigned managed identities for a single Azure resource” instead of the required outcome. Federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
That choice concerns “identify a Microsoft entra tenant as cloud identity directory”, not the immediate requirement. Federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
Question 202
A GitHub Actions workflow needs to deploy an Azure test resource without keeping an Azure client secret in repository settings. Why does the recommended approach address this particular concern?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI. This supports the decision to use Entra workload identity federation to validate trusted external OIDC assertions from a supported build service before issuing an app access token.
Incorrect Answers
The principle behind “distinguish cloud-only and hybrid identity sign-in choices” is not the one being tested. Here, federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
“distinguish workforce workload and agent identities at a conceptual level” explains a different mechanism. Here, federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
That statement concerns “reuse user-assigned managed identity deliberately” rather than the cause in this case. Here, federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
Question 203
A GitHub Actions workflow needs to deploy an Azure test resource without keeping an Azure client secret in repository settings. Which evidence best validates the proposed outcome?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token. It is the relevant test because federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
Incorrect Answers
“separate member and guest identities in collaboration” would verify a different part of the system. To check this result, run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token.
That test concerns “distinguish cloud-only and hybrid identity sign-in choices”, not the requested outcome. To check this result, run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token.
This evidence addresses “synchronize hybrid identities with explicit scope and health checks” instead of confirming the repair. To check this result, run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token.
Question 204
Consider this situation: A GitHub Actions workflow needs to deploy an Azure test resource without keeping an Azure client secret in repository settings. A team member suggests: "Store a nonexpiring service-principal password in a public CI variable because it is easier than configuring OIDC trust conditions." What is the main risk?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Anyone who obtains the static secret may impersonate the deployment application beyond the intended build run or repository boundary. The shortcut is unsafe because federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
Incorrect Answers
That consequence concerns “A migration may break old device policies or application authentication because the architecture confused a cloud…”, which is a different failure. Here, anyone who obtains the static secret may impersonate the deployment application beyond the intended build run or repository boundary.
“Leaked long-lived credentials may grant unintended privileges while resource deletion fails to remove the separately embedded…” does not describe the result of this shortcut. Here, anyone who obtains the static secret may impersonate the deployment application beyond the intended build run or repository boundary.
The alternative risk relates to “The app can inherit excessive tenant powers and may stop when the human password or MFA…”, not the stated mistake. Here, anyone who obtains the static secret may impersonate the deployment application beyond the intended build run or repository boundary.
Question 205
A security and compliance reviewer considers: A GitHub Actions workflow needs to deploy an Azure test resource without keeping an Azure client secret in repository settings. Which response and evidence should be linked?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Use Entra workload identity federation to validate trusted external OIDC assertions from a supported build service before issuing an app access token. Validation: Run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token. The action and test belong together because federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
Incorrect Answers
“separate Microsoft entra directory roles from Azure resource RBAC” evaluates a different intervention. The appropriate action is to use Entra workload identity federation to validate trusted external OIDC assertions from a supported build service before issuing an app access token. To confirm, run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token.
The linked action and check for “use system-assigned managed identities for a single Azure resource” would not resolve this case. The appropriate action is to use Entra workload identity federation to validate trusted external OIDC assertions from a supported build service before issuing an app access token. To confirm, run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token.
That action-and-evidence pair concerns “use an app registration and service principal for application access”, not this decision. The appropriate action is to use Entra workload identity federation to validate trusted external OIDC assertions from a supported build service before issuing an app access token. To confirm, run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token.
Question 206
A deployment system accepts OIDC assertions from any repository subject and accidentally allows forked builds to assume production identity. Which action best addresses this requirement?
Explanation
Correct Answer
The situation is that a deployment system accepts OIDC assertions from any repository subject and accidentally allows forked builds to assume production identity. Use Entra workload identity federation to validate trusted external OIDC assertions from a supported build service before issuing an app access token. Federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI. To verify, run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token.
Incorrect Answers
“distinguish workforce workload and agent identities at a conceptual level” is related to another task, not the failure shown here. Federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
That choice concerns “distinguish cloud-only and hybrid identity sign-in choices”, not the immediate requirement. Federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
The proposed action addresses “separate member and guest identities in collaboration” rather than the problem described. Federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
Question 207
A cloud security learner considers: A deployment system accepts OIDC assertions from any repository subject and accidentally allows forked builds to assume production identity. Which underlying principle applies?
Explanation
Correct Answer
The situation is that a deployment system accepts OIDC assertions from any repository subject and accidentally allows forked builds to assume production identity. Federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI. This supports the decision to use Entra workload identity federation to validate trusted external OIDC assertions from a supported build service before issuing an app access token.
Incorrect Answers
“separate member and guest identities in collaboration” describes another technical distinction. Here, federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
“use an app registration and service principal for application access” explains a different mechanism. Here, federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
The principle behind “synchronize hybrid identities with explicit scope and health checks” is not the one being tested. Here, federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
Question 208
A deployment system accepts OIDC assertions from any repository subject and accidentally allows forked builds to assume production identity. What should the team examine before accepting the result?
Explanation
Correct Answer
The situation is that a deployment system accepts OIDC assertions from any repository subject and accidentally allows forked builds to assume production identity. Run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token. It is the relevant test because federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
Incorrect Answers
That test concerns “reuse user-assigned managed identity deliberately”, not the requested outcome. To check this result, run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token.
The proposed check is relevant to “separate member and guest identities in collaboration”, but not sufficient here. To check this result, run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token.
This evidence addresses “identify a Microsoft entra tenant as cloud identity directory” instead of confirming the repair. To check this result, run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token.
Question 209
A deployment system accepts OIDC assertions from any repository subject and accidentally allows forked builds to assume production identity. The proposed shortcut is: "Store a nonexpiring service-principal password in a public CI variable because it is easier than configuring OIDC trust conditions." Which failure is most likely?
Explanation
Correct Answer
The situation is that a deployment system accepts OIDC assertions from any repository subject and accidentally allows forked builds to assume production identity. Anyone who obtains the static secret may impersonate the deployment application beyond the intended build run or repository boundary. The shortcut is unsafe because federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
Incorrect Answers
The alternative risk relates to “A failure of an on-prem authentication endpoint can cause unexpected outage when the organization selected a…”, not the stated mistake. Here, anyone who obtains the static secret may impersonate the deployment application beyond the intended build run or repository boundary.
“Former employee access may persist in cloud apps because directory changes did not propagate through an…” can arise elsewhere, but it is not the most direct risk here. Here, anyone who obtains the static secret may impersonate the deployment application beyond the intended build run or repository boundary.
That consequence concerns “The app can inherit excessive tenant powers and may stop when the human password or MFA…”, which is a different failure. Here, anyone who obtains the static secret may impersonate the deployment application beyond the intended build run or repository boundary.
Question 210
For this case—A deployment system accepts OIDC assertions from any repository subject and accidentally allows forked builds to assume production identity.—which implementation and acceptance check are correctly paired?
Explanation
Correct Answer
The situation is that a deployment system accepts OIDC assertions from any repository subject and accidentally allows forked builds to assume production identity. Use Entra workload identity federation to validate trusted external OIDC assertions from a supported build service before issuing an app access token. Validation: Run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token. The action and test belong together because federated workload credentials exchange verified short-lived tokens based on issuer, audience and subject, avoiding stored long-lived cloud secrets in CI.
Incorrect Answers
“separate member and guest identities in collaboration” evaluates a different intervention. The appropriate action is to use Entra workload identity federation to validate trusted external OIDC assertions from a supported build service before issuing an app access token. To confirm, run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token.
That action-and-evidence pair concerns “use system-assigned managed identities for a single Azure resource”, not this decision. The appropriate action is to use Entra workload identity federation to validate trusted external OIDC assertions from a supported build service before issuing an app access token. To confirm, run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token.
The proposed pair focuses on “identify a Microsoft entra tenant as cloud identity directory” instead. The appropriate action is to use Entra workload identity federation to validate trusted external OIDC assertions from a supported build service before issuing an app access token. To confirm, run a sandbox pipeline with an approved issuer and branch-bound subject, then show an unexpected branch or audience cannot obtain the cloud token.
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