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ISC CCSP Practice Test 61

Question 600

A retailer separates application tiers but internal microservices exchange sensitive records without mutual authentication. Suppose the team makes this shortcut instead: Allow every workload in the Kubernetes cluster to call every financial API merely because traffic stays internal. Which outcome is the most likely direct consequence?

  1. A leaked image or source bundle grants enduring privileged access across unrelated services
  2. Authenticated attackers retrieve or modify other tenants' application records by changing resource IDs
  3. An attacker uses an ordinary content upload to trigger unauthorized tool actions or data disclosure
  4. A compromised low-value service pivots to sensitive internal APIs without user-facing controls

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: D

A.

This failure concerns another scenario: A bank's serverless functions all reuse a broad database administrator password stored in their source code. In the stated case: A retailer separates application tiers but internal microservices exchange sensitive records without mutual authentication. The relevant consequence is: A compromised low-value service pivots to sensitive internal APIs without user-facing controls. The control that prevents it is: Require authenticated service identities, appropriate mutual TLS and narrowly authorized service-to-service routes for cloud microservices.

B.

This failure concerns another scenario: A SaaS team repeatedly introduces broken object-level authorization despite enforcing user login. In the stated case: A retailer separates application tiers but internal microservices exchange sensitive records without mutual authentication. The relevant consequence is: A compromised low-value service pivots to sensitive internal APIs without user-facing controls. The control that prevents it is: Require authenticated service identities, appropriate mutual TLS and narrowly authorized service-to-service routes for cloud microservices.

C.

This failure concerns another scenario: A customer support assistant reads uploaded tickets and has permission to change billing access lists. In the stated case: A retailer separates application tiers but internal microservices exchange sensitive records without mutual authentication. The relevant consequence is: A compromised low-value service pivots to sensitive internal APIs without user-facing controls. The control that prevents it is: Require authenticated service identities, appropriate mutual TLS and narrowly authorized service-to-service routes for cloud microservices.

D.

A compromised low-value service pivots to sensitive internal APIs without user-facing controls. This is the risk in the stated situation: A retailer separates application tiers but internal microservices exchange sensitive records without mutual authentication. The risky shortcut is: Allow every workload in the Kubernetes cluster to call every financial API merely because traffic stays internal. Prevent it by: Require authenticated service identities, appropriate mutual TLS and narrowly authorized service-to-service routes for cloud microservices.

Question 601

A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. Which cloud security control or governance decision most directly addresses the described issue while keeping the change scoped?

  1. Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping
  2. Use workload identities or managed secrets vaults with automatic rotation and least-privilege access instead of embedded static credentials
  3. Provide role-specific secure cloud coding education on object authorization, API authentication and negative security tests
  4. Teach application teams to treat retrieved documents and model output as untrusted inputs before triggering sensitive cloud actions

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: A

A.

Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping. The technical reason is: Single sign-on simplifies authentication but cannot replace correct authorization or protection against a compromised identity provider. The stated condition is: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. Confirm the result by: Test an expired assertion, an unassigned role and a valid MFA-authenticated session for the intended application access.

B.

This action is appropriate in a different case: A bank's serverless functions all reuse a broad database administrator password stored in their source code. There, the reason is: Long-lived shared secrets in application code are difficult to revoke and amplify the impact of source or artifact exposure. The current case is: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. The appropriate response is: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

C.

This action is appropriate in a different case: A SaaS team repeatedly introduces broken object-level authorization despite enforcing user login. There, the reason is: Cloud API routes often expose object identifiers, and a valid login does not authorize access to every tenant object. The current case is: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. The appropriate response is: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

D.

This action is appropriate in a different case: A customer support assistant reads uploaded tickets and has permission to change billing access lists. There, the reason is: A model can follow malicious instructions embedded in lower-trust text unless tools, data and privileges are bounded outside the prompt. The current case is: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. The appropriate response is: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

Question 602

A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. An engineer recommends: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping. Which technical explanation most directly justifies this recommendation?

  1. A model can follow malicious instructions embedded in lower-trust text unless tools, data and privileges are bounded outside the prompt
  2. Single sign-on simplifies authentication but cannot replace correct authorization or protection against a compromised identity provider
  3. Security requirements discovered only after deployment become expensive or incompatible with existing application architecture
  4. Frequent deployment creates repeated change risk, so security review must track each material feature and dependency update

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: B

A.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Teach application teams to treat retrieved documents and model output as untrusted inputs before triggering sensitive cloud actions. It applies to: A customer support assistant reads uploaded tickets and has permission to change billing access lists. The actual case is: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. The mechanism relevant here is: Single sign-on simplifies authentication but cannot replace correct authorization or protection against a compromised identity provider.

B.

Single sign-on simplifies authentication but cannot replace correct authorization or protection against a compromised identity provider. That mechanism explains the decision: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping. In the reported situation: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. Confirmation requires: Test an expired assertion, an unassigned role and a valid MFA-authenticated session for the intended application access.

C.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Translate business and privacy needs into measurable authentication, authorization, encryption and recovery criteria at the start of the SDLC. It applies to: A medical SaaS startup writes an application first and asks later how to prevent staff from viewing patient data. The actual case is: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. The mechanism relevant here is: Single sign-on simplifies authentication but cannot replace correct authorization or protection against a compromised identity provider.

D.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Use risk-based secure design and code validation throughout agile iterations instead of relying on one end-stage checklist. It applies to: A finance platform releases API changes daily but schedules its only security test annually. The actual case is: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. The mechanism relevant here is: Single sign-on simplifies authentication but cannot replace correct authorization or protection against a compromised identity provider.

Question 603

A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. After applying the relevant fix, which observable evidence would most convincingly establish that the underlying issue has been resolved?

  1. Introduce a vulnerable test change and confirm pipeline gating or required human review blocks release before production
  2. Walk an attacker path through the model and verify mitigations are tied to specific data flows and security tests
  3. Test an expired assertion, an unassigned role and a valid MFA-authenticated session for the intended application access
  4. Commit a deliberately public storage rule in a test branch and confirm the CI policy prevents deployment

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: C

A.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Use risk-based secure design and code validation throughout agile iterations instead of relying on one end-stage checklist. That remedy applies to: A finance platform releases API changes daily but schedules its only security test annually. The present condition is: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. To assess it, check: Test an expired assertion, an unassigned role and a valid MFA-authenticated session for the intended application access.

B.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Perform structured threat modeling of exposed trust boundaries and select controls for spoofing, tampering, disclosure, denial and privilege escalation. That remedy applies to: A multi-tenant booking API accepts customer resource IDs without modeling horizontal access attacks. The present condition is: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. To assess it, check: Test an expired assertion, an unassigned role and a valid MFA-authenticated session for the intended application access.

C.

Test an expired assertion, an unassigned role and a valid MFA-authenticated session for the intended application access. This check directly tests: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping. The underlying behavior is: Single sign-on simplifies authentication but cannot replace correct authorization or protection against a compromised identity provider. The case is: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group.

D.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Enforce peer review, secret scanning and policy checks against cloud IaC changes before they are applied. That remedy applies to: A university uses shared infrastructure templates containing hard-coded production API tokens. The present condition is: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. To assess it, check: Test an expired assertion, an unassigned role and a valid MFA-authenticated session for the intended application access.

Question 604

A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. Which apparently convenient shortcut would most directly undermine safe resolution of this specific situation?

  1. Embed live root credentials in a shared Terraform file and automatically apply public-firewall rules without review
  2. Treat one passing static linter as proof that every dependency and deployed API is free of exploitable defects
  3. Test only the happy-path administrator action and label the entire feature security validated
  4. Grant every federated employee global administrator privileges because the identity provider confirmed login

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: D

A.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A university uses shared infrastructure templates containing hard-coded production API tokens. The risk in this question concerns: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Grant every federated employee global administrator privileges because the identity provider confirmed login. Use this response instead: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

B.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A cloud payment API passes source checks but deploys an outdated parser with a published security issue. The risk in this question concerns: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Grant every federated employee global administrator privileges because the identity provider confirmed login. Use this response instead: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

C.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A property portal's normal customer checkout succeeds but users can alter another account's billing address. The risk in this question concerns: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Grant every federated employee global administrator privileges because the identity provider confirmed login. Use this response instead: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

D.

Grant every federated employee global administrator privileges because the identity provider confirmed login. This shortcut is unsafe for: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. The resulting failure can be: A compromised low-privilege user gains broad cloud control despite successful single sign-on enforcement. The safer response is: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

Question 605

A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. Suppose the team makes this shortcut instead: Grant every federated employee global administrator privileges because the identity provider confirmed login. Which outcome is the most likely direct consequence?

  1. A compromised low-privilege user gains broad cloud control despite successful single sign-on enforcement
  2. A minor application change silently reintroduces horizontal or vertical privilege escalation
  3. A substituted or vulnerable dependency enters the application supply chain without a reliable integrity trail
  4. Attackers use stolen low-privilege tokens to read other records or exhaust backend capacity

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: A

A.

A compromised low-privilege user gains broad cloud control despite successful single sign-on enforcement. This is the risk in the stated situation: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. The risky shortcut is: Grant every federated employee global administrator privileges because the identity provider confirmed login. Prevent it by: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

B.

This failure concerns another scenario: A property portal's normal customer checkout succeeds but users can alter another account's billing address. In the stated case: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. The relevant consequence is: A compromised low-privilege user gains broad cloud control despite successful single sign-on enforcement. The control that prevents it is: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

C.

This failure concerns another scenario: A healthcare startup uses an unpinned container image that an unknown publisher can replace. In the stated case: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. The relevant consequence is: A compromised low-privilege user gains broad cloud control despite successful single sign-on enforcement. The control that prevents it is: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

D.

This failure concerns another scenario: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. In the stated case: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. The relevant consequence is: A compromised low-privilege user gains broad cloud control despite successful single sign-on enforcement. The control that prevents it is: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

Question 606

A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. Which cloud security control or governance decision most directly addresses the described issue while keeping the change scoped?

  1. Teach application teams to treat retrieved documents and model output as untrusted inputs before triggering sensitive cloud actions
  2. Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping
  3. Translate business and privacy needs into measurable authentication, authorization, encryption and recovery criteria at the start of the SDLC
  4. Use risk-based secure design and code validation throughout agile iterations instead of relying on one end-stage checklist

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: B

A.

This action is appropriate in a different case: A customer support assistant reads uploaded tickets and has permission to change billing access lists. There, the reason is: A model can follow malicious instructions embedded in lower-trust text unless tools, data and privileges are bounded outside the prompt. The current case is: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. The appropriate response is: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

B.

Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping. The technical reason is: Single sign-on simplifies authentication but cannot replace correct authorization or protection against a compromised identity provider. The stated condition is: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. Confirm the result by: Test an expired assertion, an unassigned role and a valid MFA-authenticated session for the intended application access.

C.

This action is appropriate in a different case: A medical SaaS startup writes an application first and asks later how to prevent staff from viewing patient data. There, the reason is: Security requirements discovered only after deployment become expensive or incompatible with existing application architecture. The current case is: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. The appropriate response is: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

D.

This action is appropriate in a different case: A finance platform releases API changes daily but schedules its only security test annually. There, the reason is: Frequent deployment creates repeated change risk, so security review must track each material feature and dependency update. The current case is: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. The appropriate response is: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

Question 607

A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. An engineer recommends: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping. Which technical explanation most directly justifies this recommendation?

  1. Frequent deployment creates repeated change risk, so security review must track each material feature and dependency update
  2. Threat modeling connects system architecture to plausible abuse paths so authorization and rate-limit controls address actual threats
  3. Single sign-on simplifies authentication but cannot replace correct authorization or protection against a compromised identity provider
  4. Configuration is executable architecture, so insecure defaults and exposed credentials can propagate instantly through automation

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: C

A.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Use risk-based secure design and code validation throughout agile iterations instead of relying on one end-stage checklist. It applies to: A finance platform releases API changes daily but schedules its only security test annually. The actual case is: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. The mechanism relevant here is: Single sign-on simplifies authentication but cannot replace correct authorization or protection against a compromised identity provider.

B.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Perform structured threat modeling of exposed trust boundaries and select controls for spoofing, tampering, disclosure, denial and privilege escalation. It applies to: A multi-tenant booking API accepts customer resource IDs without modeling horizontal access attacks. The actual case is: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. The mechanism relevant here is: Single sign-on simplifies authentication but cannot replace correct authorization or protection against a compromised identity provider.

C.

Single sign-on simplifies authentication but cannot replace correct authorization or protection against a compromised identity provider. That mechanism explains the decision: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping. In the reported situation: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. Confirmation requires: Test an expired assertion, an unassigned role and a valid MFA-authenticated session for the intended application access.

D.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Enforce peer review, secret scanning and policy checks against cloud IaC changes before they are applied. It applies to: A university uses shared infrastructure templates containing hard-coded production API tokens. The actual case is: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. The mechanism relevant here is: Single sign-on simplifies authentication but cannot replace correct authorization or protection against a compromised identity provider.

Question 608

A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. After applying the relevant fix, which observable evidence would most convincingly establish that the underlying issue has been resolved?

  1. Commit a deliberately public storage rule in a test branch and confirm the CI policy prevents deployment
  2. Inject a safe known vulnerable dependency and a staging runtime flaw and verify each matching scanner detects its own class of risk
  3. Re-run a role-bypass abuse case after each release and verify denial and logging remain effective
  4. Test an expired assertion, an unassigned role and a valid MFA-authenticated session for the intended application access

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: D

A.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Enforce peer review, secret scanning and policy checks against cloud IaC changes before they are applied. That remedy applies to: A university uses shared infrastructure templates containing hard-coded production API tokens. The present condition is: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. To assess it, check: Test an expired assertion, an unassigned role and a valid MFA-authenticated session for the intended application access.

B.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Run complementary source, dependency and runtime security tests with severity-based release gates. That remedy applies to: A cloud payment API passes source checks but deploys an outdated parser with a published security issue. The present condition is: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. To assess it, check: Test an expired assertion, an unassigned role and a valid MFA-authenticated session for the intended application access.

C.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Add automated negative-path tests for cross-tenant requests, malformed tokens and privilege escalation alongside normal functional tests. That remedy applies to: A property portal's normal customer checkout succeeds but users can alter another account's billing address. The present condition is: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. To assess it, check: Test an expired assertion, an unassigned role and a valid MFA-authenticated session for the intended application access.

D.

Test an expired assertion, an unassigned role and a valid MFA-authenticated session for the intended application access. This check directly tests: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping. The underlying behavior is: Single sign-on simplifies authentication but cannot replace correct authorization or protection against a compromised identity provider. The case is: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope.

Question 609

A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. Which apparently convenient shortcut would most directly undermine safe resolution of this specific situation?

  1. Grant every federated employee global administrator privileges because the identity provider confirmed login
  2. Test only the happy-path administrator action and label the entire feature security validated
  3. Pull production containers from an untrusted public tag solely because the image name resembles a trusted project
  4. Assume an HTTPS endpoint can safely skip user authorization and request throttling

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: A

A.

Grant every federated employee global administrator privileges because the identity provider confirmed login. This shortcut is unsafe for: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. The resulting failure can be: A compromised low-privilege user gains broad cloud control despite successful single sign-on enforcement. The safer response is: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

B.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A property portal's normal customer checkout succeeds but users can alter another account's billing address. The risk in this question concerns: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Grant every federated employee global administrator privileges because the identity provider confirmed login. Use this response instead: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

C.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A healthcare startup uses an unpinned container image that an unknown publisher can replace. The risk in this question concerns: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Grant every federated employee global administrator privileges because the identity provider confirmed login. Use this response instead: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

D.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. The risk in this question concerns: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Grant every federated employee global administrator privileges because the identity provider confirmed login. Use this response instead: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

Question 610

A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. Suppose the team makes this shortcut instead: Grant every federated employee global administrator privileges because the identity provider confirmed login. Which outcome is the most likely direct consequence?

  1. Attackers use stolen low-privilege tokens to read other records or exhaust backend capacity
  2. A compromised low-privilege user gains broad cloud control despite successful single sign-on enforcement
  3. One compromised container can access host credentials or neighboring workloads
  4. A compromised low-value service pivots to sensitive internal APIs without user-facing controls

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: B

A.

This failure concerns another scenario: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. In the stated case: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. The relevant consequence is: A compromised low-privilege user gains broad cloud control despite successful single sign-on enforcement. The control that prevents it is: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

B.

A compromised low-privilege user gains broad cloud control despite successful single sign-on enforcement. This is the risk in the stated situation: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. The risky shortcut is: Grant every federated employee global administrator privileges because the identity provider confirmed login. Prevent it by: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

C.

This failure concerns another scenario: A university deploys student-made web containers with access to the host container engine socket. In the stated case: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. The relevant consequence is: A compromised low-privilege user gains broad cloud control despite successful single sign-on enforcement. The control that prevents it is: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

D.

This failure concerns another scenario: A clinic's internal appointment API trusts any caller from the cluster pod network. In the stated case: A research portal accepts SSO assertions for a different application audience without verifying token scope. The relevant consequence is: A compromised low-privilege user gains broad cloud control despite successful single sign-on enforcement. The control that prevents it is: Integrate cloud applications with a trusted identity provider using signed federation assertions, MFA and least-privilege role mapping.

Certified Cloud Security Professional (CCSP) (CCSP) Practice Tests