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ISC CCSP Practice Test 58

Question 570

A bank must trace production API packages to reproducible signed builds for supplier assurance. Suppose the team makes this shortcut instead: Pull production containers from an untrusted public tag solely because the image name resembles a trusted project. Which outcome is the most likely direct consequence?

  1. A compromised low-value service pivots to sensitive internal APIs without user-facing controls
  2. A substituted or vulnerable dependency enters the application supply chain without a reliable integrity trail
  3. A compromised low-privilege user gains broad cloud control despite successful single sign-on enforcement
  4. A leaked image or source bundle grants enduring privileged access across unrelated services

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: B

A.

This failure concerns another scenario: A clinic's internal appointment API trusts any caller from the cluster pod network. In the stated case: A bank must trace production API packages to reproducible signed builds for supplier assurance. The relevant consequence is: A substituted or vulnerable dependency enters the application supply chain without a reliable integrity trail. The control that prevents it is: Require signed build artifacts, inventory of third-party dependencies and policy evaluation before deploying cloud application images.

B.

A substituted or vulnerable dependency enters the application supply chain without a reliable integrity trail. This is the risk in the stated situation: A bank must trace production API packages to reproducible signed builds for supplier assurance. The risky shortcut is: Pull production containers from an untrusted public tag solely because the image name resembles a trusted project. Prevent it by: Require signed build artifacts, inventory of third-party dependencies and policy evaluation before deploying cloud application images.

C.

This failure concerns another scenario: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. In the stated case: A bank must trace production API packages to reproducible signed builds for supplier assurance. The relevant consequence is: A substituted or vulnerable dependency enters the application supply chain without a reliable integrity trail. The control that prevents it is: Require signed build artifacts, inventory of third-party dependencies and policy evaluation before deploying cloud application images.

D.

This failure concerns another scenario: A bank's serverless functions all reuse a broad database administrator password stored in their source code. In the stated case: A bank must trace production API packages to reproducible signed builds for supplier assurance. The relevant consequence is: A substituted or vulnerable dependency enters the application supply chain without a reliable integrity trail. The control that prevents it is: Require signed build artifacts, inventory of third-party dependencies and policy evaluation before deploying cloud application images.

Question 571

A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. Which cloud security control or governance decision most directly addresses the described issue while keeping the change scoped?

  1. Teach application teams to treat retrieved documents and model output as untrusted inputs before triggering sensitive cloud actions
  2. Translate business and privacy needs into measurable authentication, authorization, encryption and recovery criteria at the start of the SDLC
  3. Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries
  4. Use risk-based secure design and code validation throughout agile iterations instead of relying on one end-stage checklist

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: C

A.

This action is appropriate in a different case: A customer support assistant reads uploaded tickets and has permission to change billing access lists. There, the reason is: A model can follow malicious instructions embedded in lower-trust text unless tools, data and privileges are bounded outside the prompt. The current case is: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. The appropriate response is: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

B.

This action is appropriate in a different case: A medical SaaS startup writes an application first and asks later how to prevent staff from viewing patient data. There, the reason is: Security requirements discovered only after deployment become expensive or incompatible with existing application architecture. The current case is: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. The appropriate response is: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

C.

Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries. The technical reason is: TLS protects transport but cannot determine whether an authenticated caller may access a particular business object or issue excessive requests. The stated condition is: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. Confirm the result by: Use a test client to verify invalid tokens, unauthorized object IDs and over-limit calls fail with correct logged outcomes.

D.

This action is appropriate in a different case: A finance platform releases API changes daily but schedules its only security test annually. There, the reason is: Frequent deployment creates repeated change risk, so security review must track each material feature and dependency update. The current case is: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. The appropriate response is: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

Question 572

A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. An engineer recommends: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries. Which technical explanation most directly justifies this recommendation?

  1. Frequent deployment creates repeated change risk, so security review must track each material feature and dependency update
  2. Threat modeling connects system architecture to plausible abuse paths so authorization and rate-limit controls address actual threats
  3. Configuration is executable architecture, so insecure defaults and exposed credentials can propagate instantly through automation
  4. TLS protects transport but cannot determine whether an authenticated caller may access a particular business object or issue excessive requests

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: D

A.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Use risk-based secure design and code validation throughout agile iterations instead of relying on one end-stage checklist. It applies to: A finance platform releases API changes daily but schedules its only security test annually. The actual case is: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. The mechanism relevant here is: TLS protects transport but cannot determine whether an authenticated caller may access a particular business object or issue excessive requests.

B.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Perform structured threat modeling of exposed trust boundaries and select controls for spoofing, tampering, disclosure, denial and privilege escalation. It applies to: A multi-tenant booking API accepts customer resource IDs without modeling horizontal access attacks. The actual case is: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. The mechanism relevant here is: TLS protects transport but cannot determine whether an authenticated caller may access a particular business object or issue excessive requests.

C.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Enforce peer review, secret scanning and policy checks against cloud IaC changes before they are applied. It applies to: A university uses shared infrastructure templates containing hard-coded production API tokens. The actual case is: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. The mechanism relevant here is: TLS protects transport but cannot determine whether an authenticated caller may access a particular business object or issue excessive requests.

D.

TLS protects transport but cannot determine whether an authenticated caller may access a particular business object or issue excessive requests. That mechanism explains the decision: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries. In the reported situation: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. Confirmation requires: Use a test client to verify invalid tokens, unauthorized object IDs and over-limit calls fail with correct logged outcomes.

Question 573

A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. After applying the relevant fix, which observable evidence would most convincingly establish that the underlying issue has been resolved?

  1. Use a test client to verify invalid tokens, unauthorized object IDs and over-limit calls fail with correct logged outcomes
  2. Commit a deliberately public storage rule in a test branch and confirm the CI policy prevents deployment
  3. Inject a safe known vulnerable dependency and a staging runtime flaw and verify each matching scanner detects its own class of risk
  4. Re-run a role-bypass abuse case after each release and verify denial and logging remain effective

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: A

A.

Use a test client to verify invalid tokens, unauthorized object IDs and over-limit calls fail with correct logged outcomes. This check directly tests: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries. The underlying behavior is: TLS protects transport but cannot determine whether an authenticated caller may access a particular business object or issue excessive requests. The case is: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user.

B.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Enforce peer review, secret scanning and policy checks against cloud IaC changes before they are applied. That remedy applies to: A university uses shared infrastructure templates containing hard-coded production API tokens. The present condition is: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. To assess it, check: Use a test client to verify invalid tokens, unauthorized object IDs and over-limit calls fail with correct logged outcomes.

C.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Run complementary source, dependency and runtime security tests with severity-based release gates. That remedy applies to: A cloud payment API passes source checks but deploys an outdated parser with a published security issue. The present condition is: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. To assess it, check: Use a test client to verify invalid tokens, unauthorized object IDs and over-limit calls fail with correct logged outcomes.

D.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Add automated negative-path tests for cross-tenant requests, malformed tokens and privilege escalation alongside normal functional tests. That remedy applies to: A property portal's normal customer checkout succeeds but users can alter another account's billing address. The present condition is: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. To assess it, check: Use a test client to verify invalid tokens, unauthorized object IDs and over-limit calls fail with correct logged outcomes.

Question 574

A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. Which apparently convenient shortcut would most directly undermine safe resolution of this specific situation?

  1. Test only the happy-path administrator action and label the entire feature security validated
  2. Assume an HTTPS endpoint can safely skip user authorization and request throttling
  3. Run every internet-facing container as privileged with the host filesystem mounted to simplify debugging
  4. Allow every workload in the Kubernetes cluster to call every financial API merely because traffic stays internal

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: B

A.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A property portal's normal customer checkout succeeds but users can alter another account's billing address. The risk in this question concerns: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Assume an HTTPS endpoint can safely skip user authorization and request throttling. Use this response instead: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

B.

Assume an HTTPS endpoint can safely skip user authorization and request throttling. This shortcut is unsafe for: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. The resulting failure can be: Attackers use stolen low-privilege tokens to read other records or exhaust backend capacity. The safer response is: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

C.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A university deploys student-made web containers with access to the host container engine socket. The risk in this question concerns: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Assume an HTTPS endpoint can safely skip user authorization and request throttling. Use this response instead: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

D.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A clinic's internal appointment API trusts any caller from the cluster pod network. The risk in this question concerns: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Assume an HTTPS endpoint can safely skip user authorization and request throttling. Use this response instead: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

Question 575

A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. Suppose the team makes this shortcut instead: Assume an HTTPS endpoint can safely skip user authorization and request throttling. Which outcome is the most likely direct consequence?

  1. A compromised low-value service pivots to sensitive internal APIs without user-facing controls
  2. A compromised low-privilege user gains broad cloud control despite successful single sign-on enforcement
  3. Attackers use stolen low-privilege tokens to read other records or exhaust backend capacity
  4. A leaked image or source bundle grants enduring privileged access across unrelated services

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: C

A.

This failure concerns another scenario: A clinic's internal appointment API trusts any caller from the cluster pod network. In the stated case: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. The relevant consequence is: Attackers use stolen low-privilege tokens to read other records or exhaust backend capacity. The control that prevents it is: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

B.

This failure concerns another scenario: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. In the stated case: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. The relevant consequence is: Attackers use stolen low-privilege tokens to read other records or exhaust backend capacity. The control that prevents it is: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

C.

Attackers use stolen low-privilege tokens to read other records or exhaust backend capacity. This is the risk in the stated situation: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. The risky shortcut is: Assume an HTTPS endpoint can safely skip user authorization and request throttling. Prevent it by: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

D.

This failure concerns another scenario: A bank's serverless functions all reuse a broad database administrator password stored in their source code. In the stated case: A retail API terminates TLS correctly but accepts any account number from a logged-in user. The relevant consequence is: Attackers use stolen low-privilege tokens to read other records or exhaust backend capacity. The control that prevents it is: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

Question 576

A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. Which cloud security control or governance decision most directly addresses the described issue while keeping the change scoped?

  1. Use risk-based secure design and code validation throughout agile iterations instead of relying on one end-stage checklist
  2. Perform structured threat modeling of exposed trust boundaries and select controls for spoofing, tampering, disclosure, denial and privilege escalation
  3. Enforce peer review, secret scanning and policy checks against cloud IaC changes before they are applied
  4. Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: D

A.

This action is appropriate in a different case: A finance platform releases API changes daily but schedules its only security test annually. There, the reason is: Frequent deployment creates repeated change risk, so security review must track each material feature and dependency update. The current case is: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. The appropriate response is: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

B.

This action is appropriate in a different case: A multi-tenant booking API accepts customer resource IDs without modeling horizontal access attacks. There, the reason is: Threat modeling connects system architecture to plausible abuse paths so authorization and rate-limit controls address actual threats. The current case is: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. The appropriate response is: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

C.

This action is appropriate in a different case: A university uses shared infrastructure templates containing hard-coded production API tokens. There, the reason is: Configuration is executable architecture, so insecure defaults and exposed credentials can propagate instantly through automation. The current case is: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. The appropriate response is: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

D.

Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries. The technical reason is: TLS protects transport but cannot determine whether an authenticated caller may access a particular business object or issue excessive requests. The stated condition is: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. Confirm the result by: Use a test client to verify invalid tokens, unauthorized object IDs and over-limit calls fail with correct logged outcomes.

Question 577

A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. An engineer recommends: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries. Which technical explanation most directly justifies this recommendation?

  1. TLS protects transport but cannot determine whether an authenticated caller may access a particular business object or issue excessive requests
  2. Configuration is executable architecture, so insecure defaults and exposed credentials can propagate instantly through automation
  3. Static analysis finds code patterns, software composition analysis checks third-party components and dynamic testing observes a deployed application's behavior
  4. Functional success does not establish that unauthorized users cannot trigger the same operation through alternate inputs

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: A

A.

TLS protects transport but cannot determine whether an authenticated caller may access a particular business object or issue excessive requests. That mechanism explains the decision: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries. In the reported situation: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. Confirmation requires: Use a test client to verify invalid tokens, unauthorized object IDs and over-limit calls fail with correct logged outcomes.

B.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Enforce peer review, secret scanning and policy checks against cloud IaC changes before they are applied. It applies to: A university uses shared infrastructure templates containing hard-coded production API tokens. The actual case is: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. The mechanism relevant here is: TLS protects transport but cannot determine whether an authenticated caller may access a particular business object or issue excessive requests.

C.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Run complementary source, dependency and runtime security tests with severity-based release gates. It applies to: A cloud payment API passes source checks but deploys an outdated parser with a published security issue. The actual case is: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. The mechanism relevant here is: TLS protects transport but cannot determine whether an authenticated caller may access a particular business object or issue excessive requests.

D.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Add automated negative-path tests for cross-tenant requests, malformed tokens and privilege escalation alongside normal functional tests. It applies to: A property portal's normal customer checkout succeeds but users can alter another account's billing address. The actual case is: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. The mechanism relevant here is: TLS protects transport but cannot determine whether an authenticated caller may access a particular business object or issue excessive requests.

Question 578

A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. After applying the relevant fix, which observable evidence would most convincingly establish that the underlying issue has been resolved?

  1. Re-run a role-bypass abuse case after each release and verify denial and logging remain effective
  2. Use a test client to verify invalid tokens, unauthorized object IDs and over-limit calls fail with correct logged outcomes
  3. Launch a test service without privileged mounts and verify it cannot access host secrets or sensitive runtime sockets
  4. Spoof a test internal caller identity and verify the target service rejects access while legitimate service requests succeed

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: B

A.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Add automated negative-path tests for cross-tenant requests, malformed tokens and privilege escalation alongside normal functional tests. That remedy applies to: A property portal's normal customer checkout succeeds but users can alter another account's billing address. The present condition is: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. To assess it, check: Use a test client to verify invalid tokens, unauthorized object IDs and over-limit calls fail with correct logged outcomes.

B.

Use a test client to verify invalid tokens, unauthorized object IDs and over-limit calls fail with correct logged outcomes. This check directly tests: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries. The underlying behavior is: TLS protects transport but cannot determine whether an authenticated caller may access a particular business object or issue excessive requests. The case is: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials.

C.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Run containers with least-privilege service identities, non-root users, read-only filesystems and explicit capability constraints where supported. That remedy applies to: A university deploys student-made web containers with access to the host container engine socket. The present condition is: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. To assess it, check: Use a test client to verify invalid tokens, unauthorized object IDs and over-limit calls fail with correct logged outcomes.

D.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Require authenticated service identities, appropriate mutual TLS and narrowly authorized service-to-service routes for cloud microservices. That remedy applies to: A clinic's internal appointment API trusts any caller from the cluster pod network. The present condition is: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. To assess it, check: Use a test client to verify invalid tokens, unauthorized object IDs and over-limit calls fail with correct logged outcomes.

Question 579

A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. Which apparently convenient shortcut would most directly undermine safe resolution of this specific situation?

  1. Allow every workload in the Kubernetes cluster to call every financial API merely because traffic stays internal
  2. Grant every federated employee global administrator privileges because the identity provider confirmed login
  3. Assume an HTTPS endpoint can safely skip user authorization and request throttling
  4. Put one production cloud administrator API key in every microservice image to make deployment easier

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: C

A.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A clinic's internal appointment API trusts any caller from the cluster pod network. The risk in this question concerns: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Assume an HTTPS endpoint can safely skip user authorization and request throttling. Use this response instead: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

B.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A multinational enterprise adds SaaS login federation but accidentally maps all staff to a cloud admin group. The risk in this question concerns: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Assume an HTTPS endpoint can safely skip user authorization and request throttling. Use this response instead: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

C.

Assume an HTTPS endpoint can safely skip user authorization and request throttling. This shortcut is unsafe for: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. The resulting failure can be: Attackers use stolen low-privilege tokens to read other records or exhaust backend capacity. The safer response is: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

D.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A bank's serverless functions all reuse a broad database administrator password stored in their source code. The risk in this question concerns: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Assume an HTTPS endpoint can safely skip user authorization and request throttling. Use this response instead: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

Question 580

A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. Suppose the team makes this shortcut instead: Assume an HTTPS endpoint can safely skip user authorization and request throttling. Which outcome is the most likely direct consequence?

  1. A leaked image or source bundle grants enduring privileged access across unrelated services
  2. Authenticated attackers retrieve or modify other tenants' application records by changing resource IDs
  3. An attacker uses an ordinary content upload to trigger unauthorized tool actions or data disclosure
  4. Attackers use stolen low-privilege tokens to read other records or exhaust backend capacity

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: D

A.

This failure concerns another scenario: A bank's serverless functions all reuse a broad database administrator password stored in their source code. In the stated case: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. The relevant consequence is: Attackers use stolen low-privilege tokens to read other records or exhaust backend capacity. The control that prevents it is: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

B.

This failure concerns another scenario: A SaaS team repeatedly introduces broken object-level authorization despite enforcing user login. In the stated case: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. The relevant consequence is: Attackers use stolen low-privilege tokens to read other records or exhaust backend capacity. The control that prevents it is: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

C.

This failure concerns another scenario: A customer support assistant reads uploaded tickets and has permission to change billing access lists. In the stated case: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. The relevant consequence is: Attackers use stolen low-privilege tokens to read other records or exhaust backend capacity. The control that prevents it is: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

D.

Attackers use stolen low-privilege tokens to read other records or exhaust backend capacity. This is the risk in the stated situation: A government benefit gateway sees automated high-volume calls from valid low-privilege credentials. The risky shortcut is: Assume an HTTPS endpoint can safely skip user authorization and request throttling. Prevent it by: Enforce token validation, per-operation authorization, schema checks and rate limits at appropriate cloud API boundaries.

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