Practice Exams:

ISC CCSP Dumps

EXAM: Certified Cloud Security Professional (CCSP)
Verified By Experts
Premium Bundle
$40.00
$59.97 $99.97

CCSP Premium Bundle


  • Premium File 512 Questions & Answers
  • Training Course 43 Lectures
  • Study Guide 571 Pages

ISC CCSP Practice Test 36

Question 350

A cloud developer moves a vulnerable URL preview service to compute nodes where metadata credentials are accessible. Suppose the team makes this shortcut instead: Allow arbitrary user-controlled URLs to be fetched by a privileged application with unrestricted access to instance metadata. Which outcome is the most likely direct consequence?

  1. The fallback environment cannot decrypt or expose services after the primary region fails
  2. An attacker obtains temporary cloud credentials and reads resources outside the web application's intended authority
  3. The first real disaster reveals missing credentials and ordering steps that extend downtime and corrupt restored workflows
  4. One power or cooling fault interrupts every supposedly redundant application replica

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: B

A.

This failure concerns another scenario: A government portal has redundant compute regions but all recovery keys are held in the primary cloud region. In the stated case: A cloud developer moves a vulnerable URL preview service to compute nodes where metadata credentials are accessible. The relevant consequence is: An attacker obtains temporary cloud credentials and reads resources outside the web application's intended authority. The control that prevents it is: Use scoped instance identity tokens and metadata-service hardening to prevent untrusted processes from obtaining other workloads' credentials.

B.

An attacker obtains temporary cloud credentials and reads resources outside the web application's intended authority. This is the risk in the stated situation: A cloud developer moves a vulnerable URL preview service to compute nodes where metadata credentials are accessible. The risky shortcut is: Allow arbitrary user-controlled URLs to be fetched by a privileged application with unrestricted access to instance metadata. Prevent it by: Use scoped instance identity tokens and metadata-service hardening to prevent untrusted processes from obtaining other workloads' credentials.

C.

This failure concerns another scenario: A credit union stores weekly backup objects but has never restored the payment system from them. In the stated case: A cloud developer moves a vulnerable URL preview service to compute nodes where metadata credentials are accessible. The relevant consequence is: An attacker obtains temporary cloud credentials and reads resources outside the web application's intended authority. The control that prevents it is: Use scoped instance identity tokens and metadata-service hardening to prevent untrusted processes from obtaining other workloads' credentials.

D.

This failure concerns another scenario: A public records service has four cloud VMs but all run in one availability zone with a shared power dependency. In the stated case: A cloud developer moves a vulnerable URL preview service to compute nodes where metadata credentials are accessible. The relevant consequence is: An attacker obtains temporary cloud credentials and reads resources outside the web application's intended authority. The control that prevents it is: Use scoped instance identity tokens and metadata-service hardening to prevent untrusted processes from obtaining other workloads' credentials.

Question 351

A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. Which cloud security control or governance decision most directly addresses the described issue while keeping the change scoped?

  1. Select cloud sites that satisfy documented hazard, residency, physical security and supplier continuity requirements
  2. Model relevant co-tenant resource sharing threats and apply supported isolation, dedicated capacity or confidential computing where the workload justifies it
  3. Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users
  4. Quantify the business impact of losing a critical cloud provider region or identity service and document acceptable risk treatment

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: C

A.

This action is appropriate in a different case: An insurer selects a coastal facility for its only backup copy without evaluating local flood exposure. There, the reason is: Locational and facility risks include flood, jurisdiction, unauthorized access and shared physical dependencies beyond virtual access controls. The current case is: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. The appropriate response is: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

B.

This action is appropriate in a different case: A government research workload processes highly sensitive models on shared commodity cloud hosts. There, the reason is: Virtualization isolation can be strong yet some shared hardware features create residual co-residency or side-channel threats. The current case is: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. The appropriate response is: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

C.

Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users. The technical reason is: Control-plane permissions can modify networks, storage and identity across many workloads, making a broad account more dangerous than an individual VM account. The stated condition is: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. Confirm the result by: Attempt a prohibited cross-project network change with a test support identity and confirm denial and audit entry.

D.

This action is appropriate in a different case: A payment platform depends on one cloud identity service in a single region despite cross-zone application replicas. There, the reason is: Multiple application instances do not remove provider concentration when all depend on the same control-plane or region. The current case is: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. The appropriate response is: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

Question 352

A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. An engineer recommends: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users. Which technical explanation most directly justifies this recommendation?

  1. Multiple application instances do not remove provider concentration when all depend on the same control-plane or region
  2. Risk treatment is a deliberate ownership decision; buying insurance or installing one control never makes residual risk vanish
  3. Default-deny segmentation restricts unnecessary lateral movement while allow rules restore explicitly needed application flows
  4. Control-plane permissions can modify networks, storage and identity across many workloads, making a broad account more dangerous than an individual VM account

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: D

A.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Quantify the business impact of losing a critical cloud provider region or identity service and document acceptable risk treatment. It applies to: A payment platform depends on one cloud identity service in a single region despite cross-zone application replicas. The actual case is: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. The mechanism relevant here is: Control-plane permissions can modify networks, storage and identity across many workloads, making a broad account more dangerous than an individual VM account.

B.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Record threat likelihood, business impact, residual exposure and accountable approval before selecting mitigate, transfer, avoid or accept. It applies to: A small SaaS business considers accepting the cost of redundant storage after reviewing expected loss. The actual case is: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. The mechanism relevant here is: Control-plane permissions can modify networks, storage and identity across many workloads, making a broad account more dangerous than an individual VM account.

C.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Define least-privilege workload ingress and east-west network controls from verified service communication requirements. It applies to: A hospital web application should reach one patient database but is allowed to connect to every research project subnet. The actual case is: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. The mechanism relevant here is: Control-plane permissions can modify networks, storage and identity across many workloads, making a broad account more dangerous than an individual VM account.

D.

Control-plane permissions can modify networks, storage and identity across many workloads, making a broad account more dangerous than an individual VM account. That mechanism explains the decision: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users. In the reported situation: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. Confirmation requires: Attempt a prohibited cross-project network change with a test support identity and confirm denial and audit entry.

Question 353

A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. After applying the relevant fix, which observable evidence would most convincingly establish that the underlying issue has been resolved?

  1. Attempt a prohibited cross-project network change with a test support identity and confirm denial and audit entry
  2. Test required web-to-app-to-database connections and confirm unrelated tenant traffic is rejected and logged
  3. Request a staging elevation and verify expiry, command logging and denied actions outside the approved resource
  4. Test that a storage operator cannot change key policy and that a revoked identity cannot decrypt a sample object

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: A

A.

Attempt a prohibited cross-project network change with a test support identity and confirm denial and audit entry. This check directly tests: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users. The underlying behavior is: Control-plane permissions can modify networks, storage and identity across many workloads, making a broad account more dangerous than an individual VM account. The case is: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments.

B.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Define least-privilege workload ingress and east-west network controls from verified service communication requirements. That remedy applies to: A hospital web application should reach one patient database but is allowed to connect to every research project subnet. The present condition is: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. To assess it, check: Attempt a prohibited cross-project network change with a test support identity and confirm denial and audit entry.

C.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Require time-bound approved administrator elevation through a managed privileged-access gateway instead of permanent standing broad rights. That remedy applies to: A cloud operations team has twenty permanent administrators but typically needs write access for one planned maintenance hour. The present condition is: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. To assess it, check: Attempt a prohibited cross-project network change with a test support identity and confirm denial and audit entry.

D.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Apply storage encryption using approved managed keys with separate key-admin and data-admin roles and reliable audit trails. That remedy applies to: A clinical archive encrypts sensitive cloud volumes but lets its general help desk rotate and export all wrapping keys. The present condition is: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. To assess it, check: Attempt a prohibited cross-project network change with a test support identity and confirm denial and audit entry.

Question 354

A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. Which apparently convenient shortcut would most directly undermine safe resolution of this specific situation?

  1. Grant the same broad key administration and confidential data export rights to every storage support account
  2. Grant every application developer global cloud administrator rights because projects are already separated by tags
  3. Promise no more than five minutes of data loss with an asynchronous once-daily snapshot schedule
  4. Store the only recovery encryption keys and DNS credentials inside the same region being protected against

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: B

A.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A clinical archive encrypts sensitive cloud volumes but lets its general help desk rotate and export all wrapping keys. The risk in this question concerns: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Grant every application developer global cloud administrator rights because projects are already separated by tags. Use this response instead: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

B.

Grant every application developer global cloud administrator rights because projects are already separated by tags. This shortcut is unsafe for: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. The resulting failure can be: An ordinary compromised developer session can alter billing, security policies and unrelated production resources. The safer response is: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

C.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A cloud commerce site promises fifteen-minute data loss but captures customer orders only every twelve hours. The risk in this question concerns: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Grant every application developer global cloud administrator rights because projects are already separated by tags. Use this response instead: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

D.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A government portal has redundant compute regions but all recovery keys are held in the primary cloud region. The risk in this question concerns: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Grant every application developer global cloud administrator rights because projects are already separated by tags. Use this response instead: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

Question 355

A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. Suppose the team makes this shortcut instead: Grant every application developer global cloud administrator rights because projects are already separated by tags. Which outcome is the most likely direct consequence?

  1. The fallback environment cannot decrypt or expose services after the primary region fails
  2. The first real disaster reveals missing credentials and ordering steps that extend downtime and corrupt restored workflows
  3. An ordinary compromised developer session can alter billing, security policies and unrelated production resources
  4. One power or cooling fault interrupts every supposedly redundant application replica

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: C

A.

This failure concerns another scenario: A government portal has redundant compute regions but all recovery keys are held in the primary cloud region. In the stated case: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. The relevant consequence is: An ordinary compromised developer session can alter billing, security policies and unrelated production resources. The control that prevents it is: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

B.

This failure concerns another scenario: A credit union stores weekly backup objects but has never restored the payment system from them. In the stated case: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. The relevant consequence is: An ordinary compromised developer session can alter billing, security policies and unrelated production resources. The control that prevents it is: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

C.

An ordinary compromised developer session can alter billing, security policies and unrelated production resources. This is the risk in the stated situation: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. The risky shortcut is: Grant every application developer global cloud administrator rights because projects are already separated by tags. Prevent it by: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

D.

This failure concerns another scenario: A public records service has four cloud VMs but all run in one availability zone with a shared power dependency. In the stated case: A manufacturer gives its mobile app developers production-wide cloud network permissions for routine deployments. The relevant consequence is: An ordinary compromised developer session can alter billing, security policies and unrelated production resources. The control that prevents it is: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

Question 356

A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. Which cloud security control or governance decision most directly addresses the described issue while keeping the change scoped?

  1. Quantify the business impact of losing a critical cloud provider region or identity service and document acceptable risk treatment
  2. Record threat likelihood, business impact, residual exposure and accountable approval before selecting mitigate, transfer, avoid or accept
  3. Define least-privilege workload ingress and east-west network controls from verified service communication requirements
  4. Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: D

A.

This action is appropriate in a different case: A payment platform depends on one cloud identity service in a single region despite cross-zone application replicas. There, the reason is: Multiple application instances do not remove provider concentration when all depend on the same control-plane or region. The current case is: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. The appropriate response is: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

B.

This action is appropriate in a different case: A small SaaS business considers accepting the cost of redundant storage after reviewing expected loss. There, the reason is: Risk treatment is a deliberate ownership decision; buying insurance or installing one control never makes residual risk vanish. The current case is: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. The appropriate response is: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

C.

This action is appropriate in a different case: A hospital web application should reach one patient database but is allowed to connect to every research project subnet. There, the reason is: Default-deny segmentation restricts unnecessary lateral movement while allow rules restore explicitly needed application flows. The current case is: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. The appropriate response is: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

D.

Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users. The technical reason is: Control-plane permissions can modify networks, storage and identity across many workloads, making a broad account more dangerous than an individual VM account. The stated condition is: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. Confirm the result by: Attempt a prohibited cross-project network change with a test support identity and confirm denial and audit entry.

Question 357

A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. An engineer recommends: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users. Which technical explanation most directly justifies this recommendation?

  1. Control-plane permissions can modify networks, storage and identity across many workloads, making a broad account more dangerous than an individual VM account
  2. Default-deny segmentation restricts unnecessary lateral movement while allow rules restore explicitly needed application flows
  3. Short-lived least-privilege elevation limits how long stolen administrator credentials can modify sensitive cloud services
  4. Data at rest can be encrypted yet remain insecure if all users with storage access also control the decryption keys

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: A

A.

Control-plane permissions can modify networks, storage and identity across many workloads, making a broad account more dangerous than an individual VM account. That mechanism explains the decision: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users. In the reported situation: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. Confirmation requires: Attempt a prohibited cross-project network change with a test support identity and confirm denial and audit entry.

B.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Define least-privilege workload ingress and east-west network controls from verified service communication requirements. It applies to: A hospital web application should reach one patient database but is allowed to connect to every research project subnet. The actual case is: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. The mechanism relevant here is: Control-plane permissions can modify networks, storage and identity across many workloads, making a broad account more dangerous than an individual VM account.

C.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Require time-bound approved administrator elevation through a managed privileged-access gateway instead of permanent standing broad rights. It applies to: A cloud operations team has twenty permanent administrators but typically needs write access for one planned maintenance hour. The actual case is: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. The mechanism relevant here is: Control-plane permissions can modify networks, storage and identity across many workloads, making a broad account more dangerous than an individual VM account.

D.

This principle explains a different technical intervention: Apply storage encryption using approved managed keys with separate key-admin and data-admin roles and reliable audit trails. It applies to: A clinical archive encrypts sensitive cloud volumes but lets its general help desk rotate and export all wrapping keys. The actual case is: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. The mechanism relevant here is: Control-plane permissions can modify networks, storage and identity across many workloads, making a broad account more dangerous than an individual VM account.

Question 358

A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. After applying the relevant fix, which observable evidence would most convincingly establish that the underlying issue has been resolved?

  1. Test that a storage operator cannot change key policy and that a revoked identity cannot decrypt a sample object
  2. Attempt a prohibited cross-project network change with a test support identity and confirm denial and audit entry
  3. Run a timed recovery with known test transactions and compare restored state to target RPO and observed service RTO
  4. Disable primary-region access in a controlled exercise and confirm users complete full transactions at the alternate site

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: B

A.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Apply storage encryption using approved managed keys with separate key-admin and data-admin roles and reliable audit trails. That remedy applies to: A clinical archive encrypts sensitive cloud volumes but lets its general help desk rotate and export all wrapping keys. The present condition is: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. To assess it, check: Attempt a prohibited cross-project network change with a test support identity and confirm denial and audit entry.

B.

Attempt a prohibited cross-project network change with a test support identity and confirm denial and audit entry. This check directly tests: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users. The underlying behavior is: Control-plane permissions can modify networks, storage and identity across many workloads, making a broad account more dangerous than an individual VM account. The case is: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access.

C.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Choose backup and replication cadence so actual recoverable points and restoration time are consistent with approved business RPO and RTO. That remedy applies to: A cloud commerce site promises fifteen-minute data loss but captures customer orders only every twelve hours. The present condition is: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. To assess it, check: Attempt a prohibited cross-project network change with a test support identity and confirm denial and audit entry.

D.

This observation would verify a different remedy: Place critical application, data and identity recovery services in independently survivable locations with verified routes and documented activation order. That remedy applies to: A government portal has redundant compute regions but all recovery keys are held in the primary cloud region. The present condition is: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. To assess it, check: Attempt a prohibited cross-project network change with a test support identity and confirm denial and audit entry.

Question 359

A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. Which apparently convenient shortcut would most directly undermine safe resolution of this specific situation?

  1. Store the only recovery encryption keys and DNS credentials inside the same region being protected against
  2. Declare a recovery plan complete when a snapshot copy finishes without attempting to start the application
  3. Grant every application developer global cloud administrator rights because projects are already separated by tags
  4. Place all application replicas on separate VMs sharing the same power feed and call the deployment disaster resilient

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: C

A.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A government portal has redundant compute regions but all recovery keys are held in the primary cloud region. The risk in this question concerns: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Grant every application developer global cloud administrator rights because projects are already separated by tags. Use this response instead: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

B.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A credit union stores weekly backup objects but has never restored the payment system from them. The risk in this question concerns: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Grant every application developer global cloud administrator rights because projects are already separated by tags. Use this response instead: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

C.

Grant every application developer global cloud administrator rights because projects are already separated by tags. This shortcut is unsafe for: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. The resulting failure can be: An ordinary compromised developer session can alter billing, security policies and unrelated production resources. The safer response is: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

D.

This proposed shortcut concerns a separate case: A public records service has four cloud VMs but all run in one availability zone with a shared power dependency. The risk in this question concerns: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. Here the unsafe shortcut is: Grant every application developer global cloud administrator rights because projects are already separated by tags. Use this response instead: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

Question 360

A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. Suppose the team makes this shortcut instead: Grant every application developer global cloud administrator rights because projects are already separated by tags. Which outcome is the most likely direct consequence?

  1. One power or cooling fault interrupts every supposedly redundant application replica
  2. A compromised tenant can probe administrative services and disrupt management or storage operations
  3. A regional outage or jurisdiction conflict undermines availability and regulated data placement commitments
  4. An ordinary compromised developer session can alter billing, security policies and unrelated production resources

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: D

A.

This failure concerns another scenario: A public records service has four cloud VMs but all run in one availability zone with a shared power dependency. In the stated case: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. The relevant consequence is: An ordinary compromised developer session can alter billing, security policies and unrelated production resources. The control that prevents it is: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

B.

This failure concerns another scenario: A healthcare private cloud is built on a single unfiltered VLAN shared by user applications and hypervisor consoles. In the stated case: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. The relevant consequence is: An ordinary compromised developer session can alter billing, security policies and unrelated production resources. The control that prevents it is: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

C.

This failure concerns another scenario: An insurer selects a coastal facility for its only backup copy without evaluating local flood exposure. In the stated case: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. The relevant consequence is: An ordinary compromised developer session can alter billing, security policies and unrelated production resources. The control that prevents it is: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

D.

An ordinary compromised developer session can alter billing, security policies and unrelated production resources. This is the risk in the stated situation: A financial cloud help desk account can create new privileged roles despite requiring only resource inventory access. The risky shortcut is: Grant every application developer global cloud administrator rights because projects are already separated by tags. Prevent it by: Assign cloud management actions to narrowly scoped roles with MFA and separation between production operators and application users.

Certified Cloud Security Professional (CCSP) (CCSP) Practice Tests