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Cisco 400-007 Practice Test 73

Question 720

In a separate customer architecture review, this issue arises: A remote campus has no visibility into cloud egress because monitoring remains at the central data center. A fixed procurement ceiling rules out indefinite capacity overprovisioning. Which failure is the most direct risk of taking the tempting design shortcut?

  1. Compromise of one low-trust endpoint can move into unrelated high-value services
  2. A formally secure design may still fail business requirements through delay or downtime
  3. Incident reconstruction may fail because the attacker can alter or erase the only evidence
  4. Security teams can miss exposure introduced by distributed cloud and branch paths

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: D

A.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Design identity- and workload-informed segmentation with explicit permitted paths and default denial. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Security teams can miss exposure introduced by distributed cloud and branch paths. The distinction follows from: A single central tap cannot observe traffic that terminates or bypasses it in a distributed architecture.

B.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Balance confidentiality, integrity and availability requirements with tested service-level performance. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Security teams can miss exposure introduced by distributed cloud and branch paths. The distinction follows from: A single central tap cannot observe traffic that terminates or bypasses it in a distributed architecture.

C.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Security teams can miss exposure introduced by distributed cloud and branch paths. The distinction follows from: A single central tap cannot observe traffic that terminates or bypasses it in a distributed architecture.

D.

Security teams can miss exposure introduced by distributed cloud and branch paths. That is the risk in the reported situation—A remote campus has no visibility into cloud egress because monitoring remains at the central data center. The corrective action is: Place permitted telemetry and assurance controls at each significant trust and encryption boundary. Technical basis: A single central tap cannot observe traffic that terminates or bypasses it in a distributed architecture.

Question 721

A network design team is assessing this customer situation: Network operators can rewrite local logs on the same devices they administer. The customer will accept only measured end-to-end outcomes, not vendor feature claims. Which technical rationale best explains the proposed design choice under these constraints?

  1. Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse
  2. Packet payload capture can expose personal or confidential content beyond what performance analysis requires
  3. Fine-grained boundaries protect only when necessary service relationships are understood and preserved
  4. Distributed enforcement points must apply equivalent outcomes or routing changes can bypass access restrictions

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: A

A.

Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse. This explains the action: Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks. For the described facts—Network operators can rewrite local logs on the same devices they administer—test the outcome through: A simulated admin misconfiguration is recorded centrally and survives local log deletion with integrity verification.

B.

The alternative principle is: Packet payload capture can expose personal or confidential content beyond what performance analysis requires. It instead explains this action: Collect minimum necessary flow evidence with access controls and purpose-bound retention. For the present requirement, the controlling mechanism is: Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse.

C.

The alternative principle is: Fine-grained boundaries protect only when necessary service relationships are understood and preserved. It instead explains this action: Observe legitimate dependencies and stage microsegmentation enforcement with exception and rollback processes. For the present requirement, the controlling mechanism is: Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse.

D.

The alternative principle is: Distributed enforcement points must apply equivalent outcomes or routing changes can bypass access restrictions. It instead explains this action: Express one approved security intent and test enforcement equivalence across every active and failover path. For the present requirement, the controlling mechanism is: Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse.

Question 722

A network design team is assessing this customer situation: Network operators can rewrite local logs on the same devices they administer. The customer will accept only measured end-to-end outcomes, not vendor feature claims. Which acceptance result would most convincingly demonstrate that the design addresses the critical requirement?

  1. A controlled policy-violation test generates the expected telemetry in each intended path and preserves privacy constraints
  2. A simulated admin misconfiguration is recorded centrally and survives local log deletion with integrity verification
  3. A monitor-to-enforce rollout blocks unauthorized paths while application dependency tests remain green
  4. An unauthorized east-west access test fails while legitimate clinical or partner workflows continue

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: B

A.

The offered observation would test: Place permitted telemetry and assurance controls at each significant trust and encryption boundary. It would not establish that the stated requirement has been met. The direct evidence needed here is: A simulated admin misconfiguration is recorded centrally and survives local log deletion with integrity verification.

B.

Direct verification: A simulated admin misconfiguration is recorded centrally and survives local log deletion with integrity verification. This is the relevant evidence for the action: Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks. The reason is: Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse.

C.

The offered observation would test: Observe legitimate dependencies and stage microsegmentation enforcement with exception and rollback processes. It would not establish that the stated requirement has been met. The direct evidence needed here is: A simulated admin misconfiguration is recorded centrally and survives local log deletion with integrity verification.

D.

The offered observation would test: Design identity- and workload-informed segmentation with explicit permitted paths and default denial. It would not establish that the stated requirement has been met. The direct evidence needed here is: A simulated admin misconfiguration is recorded centrally and survives local log deletion with integrity verification.

Question 723

A network design team is assessing this customer situation: Network operators can rewrite local logs on the same devices they administer. The customer will accept only measured end-to-end outcomes, not vendor feature claims. Which failure is the most direct risk of taking the tempting design shortcut?

  1. Compromised or unmanaged devices can enter protected segments through stale compliance state
  2. An alternate route can silently violate location or inspection obligations
  3. Incident reconstruction may fail because the attacker can alter or erase the only evidence
  4. A failover can create an uninspected or permissive route to sensitive resources

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: C

A.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Define posture-based access with bounded exceptions and clearly specified degraded-mode behavior. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Incident reconstruction may fail because the attacker can alter or erase the only evidence. The distinction follows from: Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse.

B.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Map regulatory network obligations to enforceable routes, logs and repeatable evidence tests. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Incident reconstruction may fail because the attacker can alter or erase the only evidence. The distinction follows from: Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse.

C.

Incident reconstruction may fail because the attacker can alter or erase the only evidence. That is the risk in the reported situation—Network operators can rewrite local logs on the same devices they administer. The corrective action is: Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks. Technical basis: Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse.

D.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Express one approved security intent and test enforcement equivalence across every active and failover path. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Incident reconstruction may fail because the attacker can alter or erase the only evidence. The distinction follows from: Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse.

Question 724

A network design team is assessing this customer situation: Network operators can rewrite local logs on the same devices they administer. The customer will accept only measured end-to-end outcomes, not vendor feature claims. Which prerequisite should the architect confirm before choosing and defending this design?

  1. Specify posture signals, cache expiry, exception authority and offline service requirements
  2. Map traffic paths, security-policy ownership, rule precedence and fallback defaults
  3. Capture service owners, representative traffic, nonbusiness-hour flows and enforcement visibility
  4. Identify log sources, UTC alignment, storage retention, access separation and validation mechanism

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: D

A.

The offered preparation belongs with the alternative action: Define posture-based access with bounded exceptions and clearly specified degraded-mode behavior. Here the necessary starting condition is: Identify log sources, UTC alignment, storage retention, access separation and validation mechanism. It supports: Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks.

B.

The offered preparation belongs with the alternative action: Express one approved security intent and test enforcement equivalence across every active and failover path. Here the necessary starting condition is: Identify log sources, UTC alignment, storage retention, access separation and validation mechanism. It supports: Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks.

C.

The offered preparation belongs with the alternative action: Observe legitimate dependencies and stage microsegmentation enforcement with exception and rollback processes. Here the necessary starting condition is: Identify log sources, UTC alignment, storage retention, access separation and validation mechanism. It supports: Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks.

D.

The necessary starting condition is: Identify log sources, UTC alignment, storage retention, access separation and validation mechanism. This enables the action: Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks. Validate the result with: A simulated admin misconfiguration is recorded centrally and survives local log deletion with integrity verification.

Question 725

In a separate customer architecture review, this issue arises: A compliance team needs forensic evidence after a compromised routing administrator account. An approved alternate path exists, but its cost and policy limits differ. Which high-level network design choice most directly meets the stated technical and operational requirement?

  1. Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks
  2. Balance confidentiality, integrity and availability requirements with tested service-level performance
  3. Map regulatory network obligations to enforceable routes, logs and repeatable evidence tests
  4. Use individual privileged identities, centralized authorization and immutable command accounting

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: A

A.

Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks. The relevant technical reason is: Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse. Confirm through: A simulated admin misconfiguration is recorded centrally and survives local log deletion with integrity verification.

B.

The alternative addresses a different technical concern: Security mechanisms should enforce data protection without creating unacceptable critical-service outages. The governing mechanism here is: Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse. Accordingly, use: Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks.

C.

A topology diagram alone does not prove compliance when dynamic routing or policy changes occur. That supports the alternative intervention: Map regulatory network obligations to enforceable routes, logs and repeatable evidence tests. The present situation—A compliance team needs forensic evidence after a compromised routing administrator account—instead calls for: Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks. Technical basis: Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse.

D.

The alternative addresses: Use individual privileged identities, centralized authorization and immutable command accounting. Its principle is: Separating authentication, authorization and accounting limits action scope and preserves accountability. In this case the needed action is: Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks. Confirm by: A simulated admin misconfiguration is recorded centrally and survives local log deletion with integrity verification.

Question 726

In a separate customer architecture review, this issue arises: A compliance team needs forensic evidence after a compromised routing administrator account. An approved alternate path exists, but its cost and policy limits differ. Which acceptance result would most convincingly demonstrate that the design addresses the critical requirement?

  1. A monitor-to-enforce rollout blocks unauthorized paths while application dependency tests remain green
  2. A simulated admin misconfiguration is recorded centrally and survives local log deletion with integrity verification
  3. A recurring path validation captures route outcomes, enforcement decisions and signed exception history
  4. A controlled policy-violation test generates the expected telemetry in each intended path and preserves privacy constraints

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: B

A.

The offered observation would test: Observe legitimate dependencies and stage microsegmentation enforcement with exception and rollback processes. It would not establish that the stated requirement has been met. The direct evidence needed here is: A simulated admin misconfiguration is recorded centrally and survives local log deletion with integrity verification. The scenario is: A compliance team needs forensic evidence after a compromised routing administrator account.

B.

Direct verification: A simulated admin misconfiguration is recorded centrally and survives local log deletion with integrity verification. This is the relevant evidence for the action: Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks. The reason is: Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse. The scenario is: A compliance team needs forensic evidence after a compromised routing administrator account.

C.

The offered observation would test: Map regulatory network obligations to enforceable routes, logs and repeatable evidence tests. It would not establish that the stated requirement has been met. The direct evidence needed here is: A simulated admin misconfiguration is recorded centrally and survives local log deletion with integrity verification.

D.

The offered observation would test: Place permitted telemetry and assurance controls at each significant trust and encryption boundary. It would not establish that the stated requirement has been met. The direct evidence needed here is: A simulated admin misconfiguration is recorded centrally and survives local log deletion with integrity verification. The scenario is: A compliance team needs forensic evidence after a compromised routing administrator account.

Question 727

In a separate customer architecture review, this issue arises: A compliance team needs forensic evidence after a compromised routing administrator account. An approved alternate path exists, but its cost and policy limits differ. Which failure is the most direct risk of taking the tempting design shortcut?

  1. Compromised or unmanaged devices can enter protected segments through stale compliance state
  2. Misuse is difficult to attribute and compromised credentials have unnecessarily broad scope
  3. Incident reconstruction may fail because the attacker can alter or erase the only evidence
  4. Monitoring itself becomes a data-exposure and compliance risk

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: C

A.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Define posture-based access with bounded exceptions and clearly specified degraded-mode behavior. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Incident reconstruction may fail because the attacker can alter or erase the only evidence. The distinction follows from: Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse. The scenario is: A compliance team needs forensic evidence after a compromised routing administrator account.

B.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Use individual privileged identities, centralized authorization and immutable command accounting. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Incident reconstruction may fail because the attacker can alter or erase the only evidence. The distinction follows from: Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse.

C.

Incident reconstruction may fail because the attacker can alter or erase the only evidence. That is the risk in the reported situation—A compliance team needs forensic evidence after a compromised routing administrator account. The corrective action is: Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks. Technical basis: Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse.

D.

The offered consequence belongs to the alternative control path: Collect minimum necessary flow evidence with access controls and purpose-bound retention. The relevant failure for the current situation is: Incident reconstruction may fail because the attacker can alter or erase the only evidence. The distinction follows from: Independent evidence custody reduces the chance that privileged device changes erase traces of misuse.

Question 728

In a separate customer architecture review, this issue arises: A compliance team needs forensic evidence after a compromised routing administrator account. An approved alternate path exists, but its cost and policy limits differ. Which prerequisite should the architect confirm before choosing and defending this design?

  1. Build application dependency maps, workload identity confidence and policy exception procedures
  2. Classify observed fields, decide lawful purpose, control access and define retention
  3. Catalog job roles, emergency access, logging integrity and centralized AAA dependencies
  4. Identify log sources, UTC alignment, storage retention, access separation and validation mechanism

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: D

A.

The offered preparation belongs with the alternative action: Design identity- and workload-informed segmentation with explicit permitted paths and default denial. Here the necessary starting condition is: Identify log sources, UTC alignment, storage retention, access separation and validation mechanism. It supports: Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks.

B.

The offered preparation belongs with the alternative action: Collect minimum necessary flow evidence with access controls and purpose-bound retention. Here the necessary starting condition is: Identify log sources, UTC alignment, storage retention, access separation and validation mechanism. It supports: Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks.

C.

The offered preparation belongs with the alternative action: Use individual privileged identities, centralized authorization and immutable command accounting. Here the necessary starting condition is: Identify log sources, UTC alignment, storage retention, access separation and validation mechanism. It supports: Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks.

D.

The necessary starting condition is: Identify log sources, UTC alignment, storage retention, access separation and validation mechanism. This enables the action: Export authenticated time-aligned logs to access-separated immutable retention with documented integrity checks. Validate the result with: A simulated admin misconfiguration is recorded centrally and survives local log deletion with integrity verification. The scenario is: A compliance team needs forensic evidence after a compromised routing administrator account.

Question 729

A network design team is assessing this customer situation: A WAN firewall denies a partner prefix but the failover Internet route has no equivalent rule. There is an existing resilience target that the design must not weaken. Which high-level network design choice most directly meets the stated technical and operational requirement?

  1. Express one approved security intent and test enforcement equivalence across every active and failover path
  2. Place permitted telemetry and assurance controls at each significant trust and encryption boundary
  3. Define posture-based access with bounded exceptions and clearly specified degraded-mode behavior
  4. Design symmetric forwarding or supported session-state synchronization with explicit failure testing

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: A

A.

Distributed enforcement points must apply equivalent outcomes or routing changes can bypass access restrictions. For the documented situation—A WAN firewall denies a partner prefix but the failover Internet route has no equivalent rule—the targeted response is: Express one approved security intent and test enforcement equivalence across every active and failover path. Check: Allowed and denied test flows preserve policy through normal and forced alternate routing.

B.

A single central tap cannot observe traffic that terminates or bypasses it in a distributed architecture. That supports the alternative intervention: Place permitted telemetry and assurance controls at each significant trust and encryption boundary. The present situation—A WAN firewall denies a partner prefix but the failover Internet route has no equivalent rule—instead calls for: Express one approved security intent and test enforcement equivalence across every active and failover path. Technical basis: Distributed enforcement points must apply equivalent outcomes or routing changes can bypass access restrictions.

C.

The alternative addresses: Define posture-based access with bounded exceptions and clearly specified degraded-mode behavior. Its principle is: Identity assurance alone does not prove current endpoint compliance; fail-open policies change exposure during outages. In this case the needed action is: Express one approved security intent and test enforcement equivalence across every active and failover path. Confirm by: Allowed and denied test flows preserve policy through normal and forced alternate routing.

D.

The alternative addresses a different technical concern: A firewall cluster can fail over appliances without preserving sessions unless route and state dependencies are aligned. The governing mechanism here is: Distributed enforcement points must apply equivalent outcomes or routing changes can bypass access restrictions. Accordingly, use: Express one approved security intent and test enforcement equivalence across every active and failover path.

Question 730

A network design team is assessing this customer situation: A WAN firewall denies a partner prefix but the failover Internet route has no equivalent rule. There is an existing resilience target that the design must not weaken. Which technical rationale best explains the proposed design choice under these constraints?

  1. Port access authorization should depend on device and user posture rather than merely an available jack
  2. Distributed enforcement points must apply equivalent outcomes or routing changes can bypass access restrictions
  3. Language-model fluency does not prove routing or security correctness; deterministic invariants must govern deployment
  4. A single central tap cannot observe traffic that terminates or bypasses it in a distributed architecture

Answer & Explanations

Correct answer: B

A.

The alternative principle is: Port access authorization should depend on device and user posture rather than merely an available jack. It instead explains this action: Design certificate-based network access with assigned roles and a managed non-802.1X exception path. For the present requirement, the controlling mechanism is: Distributed enforcement points must apply equivalent outcomes or routing changes can bypass access restrictions.

B.

Distributed enforcement points must apply equivalent outcomes or routing changes can bypass access restrictions. This explains the action: Express one approved security intent and test enforcement equivalence across every active and failover path. For the described facts—A WAN firewall denies a partner prefix but the failover Internet route has no equivalent rule—test the outcome through: Allowed and denied test flows preserve policy through normal and forced alternate routing.

C.

The alternative principle is: Language-model fluency does not prove routing or security correctness; deterministic invariants must govern deployment. It instead explains this action: Require independent policy validation, sandbox testing and accountable human approval for AI recommendations. For the present requirement, the controlling mechanism is: Distributed enforcement points must apply equivalent outcomes or routing changes can bypass access restrictions.

D.

The alternative principle is: A single central tap cannot observe traffic that terminates or bypasses it in a distributed architecture. It instead explains this action: Place permitted telemetry and assurance controls at each significant trust and encryption boundary. For the present requirement, the controlling mechanism is: Distributed enforcement points must apply equivalent outcomes or routing changes can bypass access restrictions.

Cisco Certified Design Expert (400-007) Practice Tests